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DISCUSS 
Doe .Y.!. McMillan ~ 
Cert tc!l theCA DC (Miller, Wright & MacKinnon)(Wright, dissenting) 
SPEECH & DEBATE CLAUSE CASE 
Petrs are a class of persons composed of students at 
--"·' ··-
Jefferson Junior High School in the District of Columbia and 
their parents and guardians. Resps are (1) the chairman and 
==-
members of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 
(2) the clerk, staff director, counsel, and a consultant 
to the committee, (3) the Superintendent of Public Documents 
and the Public Printer (GPO), (4) the president and members 
of the board of education of the District of Columbia, (5) the 
DC Superintendent po public schools, (6) the principal and a 
teacher at Jefferson Junior High School, (1) a DC police 




Petrs commenced this action for damages, a declaratory 
judgment, and an injunction against further publication and 
distribution of a report of the House Committee on the 
District of Columbia on the DC school system unless 45 
pages thereof were altered to delete certain names of students. 
The pages refer to disciplinary matters, absentee lists, 
test scores, etc. Petrs contended that dissemination of 
the report so long as it contained their names lfD~IDI 
would violate their constitutional and common law right of 
privacy, would constitute a bill of attainder, would deny 
them due process of law, would violate the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871, and would cause severe damage to their mental and 
physical health, .their reputations, and their future careers. 
They also alleged that publication of their names was devoid 
of any legislative purpose. 
The USDC dismissed the complaint, and CA DC affirmed, 
over a strong dissent by Judge Wright. 
CA DC held that the Speech & Debate Clause protected I from suit ~ the members of the the con-
gressional employees and officers, insofar as they were acting 
and 
pursuant to valid legislative authorization/ in furtherance 
of a proper legislative purpose. The CA DC concluded that 
these elements were p:r:esent. The court also noted that 
the concept of separation of powers and notions of judicial 
restraint made the USDC's dismissal of the complaint proper, 
ll
for the report had already been published and there were 
apparently no plans to publish additional copies. 
CA DC held that the DC resps . (school board members, prin• 
cipal and teacherp and the school superintendent), as well 
as the federal legislative employees, were protected from 
-3-
liability by the doctrine of official immunity, because 
they were performing discretionary acts within the scope 
of their official duties • • 
FOX advises that the case be held for GRAVEL. He is 
familiar with this case in connection with his work on Gravel, 
and he will take this case up with you when Gravel is settled. 
HOLD FOR GRAVEL CEP 
6/20/72 CEP 
No. 71-6356 
Doe v. McMillan 
Cert to CA DC 
This case was held for decision in Gravel. Justice 
White has circulated a memorandum noting that the case 
deals at least in part with issues not reached by Gravel. 
He recommends that certiorari be GRANTED. 
CEP 
BENCH MEMO 
No, 71 .. 6356 
Doe v. McMillan 
CERT TO CA DC a Miller , MacK inn on; dis sent ing: \vr ight 
In the course of an investigation by the House Committee 
on the District of Columbia, officials of the D.C. school system 
----------------------~ divulged information about various pu];>ils in the :skllf~ school 
system which was incorporated into a committee report. The 
information contained such things as :ai:i:elil:eN:i:~ alledged sexual 
advances by a specifically named pupil toward a teacher, absentee 
reports containing names, test :s~~lll scores m~:a of persons, again 
named, who flunked reading tests, and other embarassing R 
information, The report was ordered into print by resolution 
of the entire House sitting as a committee of the whole (which 
is, I gather, a standard procedure). This action was commenced 
~-
-2-
by parents of some of the students named in the report, who -were allowed to proceed s:nlli:exxfi:~&:lr:i:: anonymously, seeking damages, 
a declaratory judgment, and an injunction against further publication 
of the report unless 45 pages of the xeN~x report were lli:exeg 
Nex:Ke deleted, The Neex defendants were the members of the 
House committee, xx:i:: various employees of the committee, govt 
printers, various D.C. school officials, and the United States. 
The District Court dismissed the complainS holding that 
the committee investigation was in good faith and that it was 
without power under the seperation of powers principle to 
:i:: enjoin it, It further ruled that the employees of Congrees 
--------------------------~-------------
and the D.C. govt were protected by the doctrine of official 
J.. 
immunity, ...._ The suit against the U.S was found to be imporoperly 
brought under the 'fort Claims Act because petrs had not exhausted 
all available remedies according to the procedures specified in 
that act. Petrs appealed to CA DC. A temporary injunction 
pending appeal was entered prohibiting fu~er distribution 
and publication of the report as long as it contained the names 
of the pupil~,with the exception of the absentee lists which 
the court did not find to be damaging to the children°s reputations. 
The Court of Appeals concluded, by a 2-1 vote, that it -
had no jurisdiction over the case, It concluded that Congress --- - -
had prevasive power, under the Constitution, to govern D.C., 
and that that power was accompanied by the power to investigate 
the running of the D.C. agencies, including the school system. 
The Speech or Debate Clause was found to teet the legislators 
from the suit for damages and from the annoyance of defending 
-3-
against the injunction. It was found that the iR~%Mxxxs 
inclusion of the materials in the report was within the legitimate 
sphere of legislative activity, because the naming of names was 
supposed to increase the credibility of the report. It was 
ruled further, that when employees of Congress, such as the 
printers and committee staff people, are acting pursuant to 
legislative XMKNHXXRX a~thorization in furtherance of a proper 
legislative purpose, they too were immune. In addition to the 
speech or debate ratioaale, the court indicated that i~XIl§M%x 
it could also rest on a sepration of powers theory or upon 
judicial restriant of some sort. The employees of the D.C. ---~MKRXRMRRK school system were found to be immune from suit 
under the doctrine of official immunity. The theory is that 
if officials are not free from suit in the course of the exercise 
of NXXEXN discretionary decisions, they will be XN unable to 
conduct their duties. It was noted that after this incident 
had xxxxMN~exWxi~kXxNixxeRKRNXX occureed, the school board 
had adopted a policy of confidential lit¥ which would prevent 
such incidents in the future. 
Judge Wright NXN dissented. He did not reach the question 
--.;;;;,_ . 
of whether the members of the committee were protected by the 
Speech or RE!e Debate Clause, but ruled instead that the employees 
of Congress were not. Relying on Powell v. McCormack, 395 u.s. 
~-----
486 (1969), he ar~ued that judicial immunity was to prevent 
intertierence with legislative tasks and that this would not 
result from a suit against the employees. He thought that 
separation of powers was no obstacle because that doctrine 
-4-
should not be used ~Nx~xex if the individual rights of citizens 
are allegedly being infringed, Nor does he think the matter is 
a political question, textually committed to another branch, 
Reacfuing the merits, he argued that the power of Congress to 
~NN conduct investigations and issue reports, while broad, is 
not unlimited, He argues that the information involved in the 
~-------report will severely damage the x~e reputations of the named 
violating their rights to privacy 
i::mti:~xxi:xai:i:ia individuals/and that i::s it serves no legitimate 
legislative purpose. Finally, he argues that the majority simply 
ignored major issues in the case which were dismissed below 
without a hearing. For example, there was never any proog that 
the action of releasing the information was a discretionary 
action of the school officials and hence protectable by the 
official immunity doctrine, One of the parties was an indpendent 
conslutant to the :SNDml committee, and dlamages might lie against 
him, Similarly, one of the investigators was a D.C. policeman 
who may have exceeded the :sa~N scope of his officials duties, 
Judge Wright would remand the case Nf for a hearing on ~ki:e 
these issues. 
\ 
No briefs have been filed in this case as yet, and since 
the decision below was decided and cert was granted before the 
recent decisions in Brewster and Gravel, it is ~N:s:sxXi:e likely 
that the focus of the arguments will shift somewhat in light 
of those two cases, Relying on petrs 0 cert ~e~i:N petition, 
there are four issues in the ~ case, There is also a potential 
mootnessixxRexx:sx~iai:mxxka~xxkex~Mmxi:~axi:NKXNfxxkexxe claim, since 
---. - -
the report has been issued, Petrs contend that further action 
is necessary to prevent further pbulication. I am not sure 
what this means. If it refers to republication, a than there 
is probably jurisdiction under the re(t\tfiction part of the 
Gravel decision to consider the case. 
attainder. The Consltitution forbids Congress from enacting 
bills of attainer. A bill of attainder has been defined by 
the Court in Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277 as 11 a legislative 
act which infld:cts punishment without a judicial trial." A 
\'&ia classic example would be a case in which the legislature 
by statute declares that a named indifidual should be sent to 
prison. The most recent case involving a bill of aka attainer 
was United States v. Lovett, 328 u.s. 303 (1946), in which the 
Court struck down a statute providing that certain named govt 
employees :i were not entitled to ~m compensation from govt jobs. 
This was found to be a way of punishing the individuals by 
denying the the privilege of govtt employment, and the Court 
found it to be a bill of attaineer. 
It seems to me that in this case, it is stretching the 
facts a bit to say that publication of this report is ~NNX~xa:i 
legislative punishment of the named pupils. Adverse comment 
~:nxa:nxxnl!txl!t is not traditionally regardel!t as punishment; it is 
not analagous to depriving the petrs of an ex economic benefit 
such as the right to government employment. If this is a bill 
-6-
Congressional 
of attainde~r, then every g:l!!lxk/report which criticizes named 
individuals, whether for cost over-runs or inefficent performance 
in a job is also a bill of attainder, I think this position 
b ./ d must e reJc te , 
2, The second question presented, according to the 
~XX: petition is whether the Speech or Debate cl~use requires 
agaLnst the Congressmen 
dismissal of an uncontroverted complaint/xsxx alleging that 
a report issued b~Congressmen will invade the privacy of 
the ptrs. Basically, petrs claim that the courts should balance -the speech orN debate interest with the «aRk~M~kx±xx~x~xk privacy 
interests of petrs, They argue that petrs have no other xasxm 
forum in wRRk which to assert their rights and that in cases 
like the Powell case the Court was willing to review legislative 
acts when they interefered with the rights of individuals, 
Mono .ver, they seem to argue that the report was not within 
' 
the reasonable realm of legislative activity, at least insofar 
as it names names, because there was no specific autrffjizatian 
for such a report, although there was ~ a general authorization 
to investigate the D.C. govt, and becauee the information xax 
NxiHax did not have to be published. 
This all seems to me to be a strange analysis of the 
Speech or Debate clause. Cases xk~xR like Powell concerned 
xs~x inquiries into the power of Congeess to engage in certain 
acts. In Powell, the issue was whether or not Congress could 
refuse to seat an elected Congressman on the grounds other than 
those specified in the Constitution, In other cases concerning 
x~Raix« recalcitrant committee witnesses who claimed that the 
-7-
committee had no power to ask them certain questions and thus 
that they were no guilty of contempt of Y Congress, the issue 
was the same, Indeed in Gravel, the cases relied on by petrs 







There can be no question that Congress is entitled to 
issue N committee reports, nor is there any question that the1 
committee report involved in this case was, by and large,releated 
to a duty of Congress, Thus, this case does not seem to me 
to be analagous _!;P Powell because it does not really challenge -
the power of Congress, 
Instead, petrs are actually arguing that when axiegiximaxe 
HXRX«XXRXNX~NRgXRXXXNRHiXXRXXXXK~RNRXiXRKXXMXKM le~islative 
activity conflicts with the interests of individuals, the 
Speech or Debate Clause does not necessarily prev.ent the -
courts from interfering with the legislative activity. I 
think this is an imq¥ er interepretation of the Speech or 
Debate Clause, It seems to me clear from XNMXRNH Johnson, 
Brewster, and Gravel, that if activity is iegxixxi legislative 
activity and hence protected by the Clauseo the Court has no 
gMxx jurisdiction to interfere with it. Supervision is left 
entirely in the hands of the legislature. 
/l ,, 
The crucuial question therefore is whether or not the 
activity of xxxMe publishing a committee report is legislative 
activity protected by the Clause, I think it clearly is, and 




"Committee reports, resolutions, and the act of voting 
are eN~x equally covered by it; 'L-i7n short, ••• 
things generally done in a session of the House by 
one of its memeber in relation to the business 
before it' •••• " 
Therefore, I would say that a committee report is a legislative 
act which is beyond the~ power of the courts to enjoin or 
toe otherwise interfere with because of the Speech or Debate 
~ax Clause. 
There is, however, on additonal problem which has not 
• "' .. s ( I e:' tv" 
been specifically · in the cert petition, but which may 
come up in light of Gravel. &s you will recall, Gravel held that 
republication of the Penatagon Papers, which were a part of the 
subcomittee reocrd, was not protected by the Speech or Debate 
C' ;ause. In this case, the publication by the House of the 
section of the report under challenge has already taken place. 
Petrs seek only to prevert: further publication of the report. - -I am not quite sure whether this means publication by another 
ublisher, as in Gravel, which might therefore be considered by 
the Court or whether it means distribution of the committee 
report by the Congress. If it ma« means the latter,than there 
is a ::l11:11Mei:IIR somewhat interesting quest..i.on whether public distribution 
of a Congressional report by Congress itself is a leg~dlative 
act protectee by the Clause. I tend to xkRk think that it is 
not covered if republication is not, because distributing the 
report to the general ~E public is not essentially a part of 
the xegxx legislative process. I do not mean that a court could 
enjoin the press from picking it up, but it may be possible to 
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enjoin the House or their employees from futher distribution 
If that is in fact what petrs seek, it may be that they are 
entitled to xxxxx it, provided that they can make their case 
that distribution would interfere with a }!!XK3ellfX}!!XNKegxiN 
protected right, They would thus be entitled to a remand, 
3, Pe~s' _ n::S~~stion, assuming that there is speech 
or debate protection for Congressman, is whether there is 
pr~ection for employees such as staff aids and printE'fS, 
They note that in Powell, the Court did not enjoin the Members 
of Congress but did enjoin employees like the doorkeeper and 
seargeant of arms, This was done because there are some difficult 
~XENMe problems arising out of the ~peration of powers regarding 
1\ 
the courts' power to eN.%~ enjoin a member of Congress, even if 
the act is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, Gravel 
was not decided when the petition was filed, but there was a 
CA 1 opinion. Petrs distinguish the CA 1 opinion xblk which also 
) held that aids were able to assetx the privilege, by saying 
~hat the }!IN~ people invloved in this case are ~x not close 
personal aids of the Congressmen, 
My reading of Gravel suggests that the Court means that 
any employee who assists in the performance of a xegxixx legislative 
act protected by the Speech or Debate Clause can not be interfered 
with by the Courts, Congressmen have to act through aids, whether 
they be }!!Xi:N.gx printers or legislative assistancs, And xx it is 
little more than a sham to say that publication of a committee 
xe}!!9xx report xx is protected xx activity as long as the Congressmen 
do the chores of printing themselves. On the othern hand, as 
-10= 
I suggested above, it is possible that the Court might find 
that public distribution of the document by Congress, i.e. 
distibution to persons other than Congressmen, was not a legislative 
act and that employees who attempted to engage in that N:X:sxx 
distribution could be enjoined. 
4, The final issue is the liability of the D.C. school 
officials under the discretionary action doctrine. The argument 
is that merely labeling the act discretionary is not enough 
to immunize an offical from suit. Petrs argue that it is not 
enough to determine that the function of the offical is discretionary; 
the courts must also determine that the nature of the function is 
such that it would be XNNXEX~ inhibited if this kind of law suit 
could be brought. This was not done in this case despite the 
c..~ 
fact that the D.C. e4:-:!?tilli>:ir~ has said that this is the law in 
D.C. 
This is a somewhat strange issue. For one thin~, kE 
4 J>J -r 
it is not claar whether the ruling below, which is sg~aw&a•Qe? 
~x:X~x:X~¥x:X:sxE cryptic, is based on federal law or the D.C. 
common law, If the latter, than this issue would seem to be 
aNaxgN analagous to a state law issue which is not for this 
\
Court. The starting point for analyzing the immunity of federal 
officals from suit is SaxxxxxXMR:KeN Barr v. Matteo, 360 u.s. 
564 tx9& (1959). In that case, dismissed federal employees 
sued the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stablization 
for a press release which they alleged had libeled them. 
The Court XNNN found that the officer was privleged from suit, 
but there was HNX no clear majority. Justice Harlan, x:Xx writing 
for three other members, found the case to be close, but found 
the act of issuing the press release to be within the discretion 
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of the def and thus absolutely privleged, He argued that 
such discretionary acts are privileged because federal officals 
need to be free from the annoyance of suits in order to perform 
t1 r duties and that the balance between not affording persons 
with just x grieveances against federal ~ffx~xix officials 
some relief and preserving the freedom of the officals required 
such a p~ilege. Justice Black concurred, but he placed special 
emphasis ~HX~H:K not on the fact that issuing press releases 
was within the officials duites, but on the fact that this 
was an exercising of the informing function of public officials 
which he believe too important in a democracy to be impaired 
\ 
by suit, The principal dissent by Warren argued that lower 
officials should have no privilege.ex~e~xx~~xxxEi~x 
Brennan and Stewart also dissented, 
Justices 
Barr v. Matteo is thus somewhat shaky precedent, but 
it seems at a minimum to requires ~ some kind of decisionj;Uat 
the act of the offical w "ch is the subject of the suit must 
be a discretionary act--that is an act xN:x~:kxki:xxx within the 
scope of his duties in which he must exercise his discretion. 
It is not clear to me that such a finding has been made here. 
R3xexexxM~eix For example, one of the officials is a high school 
'\ teacher, and I doubt whether releasing information EX about 
Jpupils to the public is within a teacher's regular duties. 
On the other hand, it may well be that there is some kind of 
agency relationship with Congress so that all the persons who 
gave the information to Congress in the course of the xmcexxi:~x~x 
investigation are bathed with some kind of immunity. \ve actually 
don't know quite enough about what happened, 
Not knowing much about what hapf)ened makes it somewhat 
difficult to know what to say about th~s issue, But it does 
seem to me that the Barr v. Matteo solution is not much help. 
The opinion is very :kl vague, It does not say xa what a discretionary 
duty is or how far down into the governmental heirarchy it 
extends. It gets a bit xei ridiculous to argue that someone 
like a garbageman has a privlege against suiS not shared by other 
person~ because he happens to be a federal offical. Therefore, 
assuming this issue is squarely within the case, it might well 
stand a careful re-examination designed to produce a formula 
at least more iRxeix~ii intelligible than the Barr doctrine. 
1-"C'-t 't / ""~' m"' r'l " - ('.( . I 
Perhaps the a finding that XkexxMR«K 
the ability to sue might impair governmerAJ-1 functioning is a 
~~good one. My thoughts are tenative at best, but I do not 
think you should be reluctant to re .. examine the issuel, All the 
law in this area is judge-made and there are few precedents, 
And, since Barr did not even command a majority of the Court, 
it is not a strong precedent on which peDple can rely as heavmly 
as some. For my own part, I think a govt official who ixexi±xei 
libels someone in a press release ~xxa should be no more immune 
from suit than a press agent for a ~l!!IXI!!BXXaaxx~ax~~t~xaxDi!~RxJdm* 
corporation who libels someone in a press release, and I think 
that a public shoool official who interferes with a pupil's rigth 
to privacy (which is the uncontested allegation here) by releasing 
private information should be no more exempt from XNNx suit than 
a private school employee. My guess is, however, that there are 
so many other things involved in this case, like acting on 
committe orders--assuming that is what happended, that these 
larger issues xkiiixNNK will not have to be reached. Nevertheless, 
I think a remand on this particluar issue might be called for. 
Fox 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS January 2, 1973 
Dear Chief: 
I am assigning 71-6356, Doe v. 
McMillan to Byron. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Conference 
Bill Kelly 
No . 71-6356 Doe v . McMillan 
Here are all communications which I have received on 
and which have not been circulated generally. 
LFP, Jr . :pls 
Attachments 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:%u:vumt <!):curt cf tltt 'Jllttitttl' ;%tctft.a 
'Dla.alp:ngton, tn. <.q. 20'~Jt,;l 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 3, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6356 - Doe v. McMillan 
Dear Bill: 
I am in agreement with your 








TO: February 2, 1973 
~~ ,. 
l' !\ 
~: . •(I 
',Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Doe v. 
I would appreciate your views as to Mr. Justice White's draft, 
circulated only to four of us on January 29 . 
. ~···~ 
As he aclmowledges, it is not entirely satisfactory. I have a 
~ ~ ~-t;.\.1 ' 
" reluctance to hang a potential liability on the Public Printer and the 
~· ',,:~;.? 
Superintendent of Documents when they are not the real culprits, and 
when -as a practical matter - it is impossible for either of them to 
::r; 
"'l.l'~ . ·~; • 
exercise an intel,ligent, jud~ent ·with respect to the thousands of documents 
"'~'~-- ..... ~' ' ' ' • ·.J'" ;i, 
'i' 
' ' they are requested to print each year. 
MEMORANDUM 
"''ll' 
Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
' Re: No. 71-6356 Doe v. 
~·~.~! , 
~''' I have now reviewed your three memos, which have contributed 
significantly to my education although I remain uncertain both as to the 
exact state of the present law and precisely where I am willing to go 
this case. · 
~ ~ 
• , The purpose of this memo is to summarize, in conclusory terms, " 
my understanding of a possible position which you think has some merit. 
The position would incorporate the following points, although not 
necessarily in the order stated; ~ ~ 
and nonlegislative. : 
2. Members of Congress and their aides (employees) are 
protected by the privilege of the Speech and Debate Clause from all 
~ consequences of the legislative act of publication where this is an integral 
part of the "deliberative and communicative processes" within the Congress. 
3. Republication for the purpose of general public dissemination " , 
whether privately or by the Public Printer pursuant to congressional or 





4. The type of republication specified in 3 above would not be 
privileged as against the assertion of a private right of action where the 
complainant asserts either deprivation of a constitutional right or a 
personal injury. ! 
5. We would leave open, as not being before the Court, the question ' 
whether such republication would be privileged as against Executive 
Branch action seeking imposition of criminal penalties, compelling ,, 
.. >. , ('' testimony before a grand jury, or seeking injunctive relief. (I am aware, ' 
F c>J.I . -!!,,, ~ 
l· ~:1'£: 
Bill, that you would like to draw a line between private rights and Executive 
conduct, but perhaps we should go no further than making it clear that this 
is a different question). 
6. There is no privilege, under Gravel, for republication by an 
individual member of Congress whether it be through private or government 
printing office channels. " 
It,, 
7. The Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, when ' 
acting upon instructions from the Congress or one of its Committees, are 
in the same posture as an employee (or aide) of a member or a Committee. 
-
(Bill: I am not sure this is your thought, but so understand it). ' · ~ 
8. If the foregoing points are sound, Complainants in this case 
may assert a cause of action against both the members of Congress and 







9. The relief sought by Complainants includes: 
(ii) recall and excision; and (iii) compensatory and punitive damages. 
y """ Although the CA found that injunctive relief was not an issue because of 
assurances of no further republication, no evidence was taken. Justice 
White apparently accepts the view that injunctive relief is out of the 
case, and would remand to determine whether the Printer and Superintendent ' 'I! 
may be held liable for damages. Bill Kelly suggests a remand, leaving 
open for further consideration by the lower courtsof all categories of 
requested relief. 
Additional Comment: 
, As I read BJll' s memoranda, he would allow a private action 
"' 
against both members and employees even for duly authorized republica-
tion. Although perhaps not controlling, what about Kilbourn and Powell v. , 
,(i ,, 
,, McCormick? In the former, a private person was arrested and detained ~~-
for 45 days when the House held him in contempt. Invoking their privilege, 
members of the House were dismissed from the suit, which was allowed 
to proceed against the Sergeant at Arms. It can be argued that the 
citation for contempt was clearly a legislative act, whereas as republication 
by the Public Printer for public dissemination (rather than congressional ,. ,, 
4. 
use) is not a legislative act. Nevertheless, we would certainly be 
venturing into "stormy seas" -to put it mildly - if we held that members 
of Congress were liable personally for damages for the republication 
"·":ia nd dissemination of a document pursuant to official CongressiDnal or 
Committee actim. Also, what about Sullivan v. New York Times and its 
relevance? If Sullivan is available in a libel suit, should there be a ,,,~' 
difference if the private action were framed as a constitutional violation ·. 
of the right of privacy? 
;Let us discuss this perplexing case further ahan early opportunity. 
,K; 
Justice White on the Speech or Debate C~use 
\\t;K 
February 9, 1973 
1. The basic notion seems to be a simple one, 
that all actions are either legislative or nonlegislative. 
2. The class of legislative acts includes speech 
on the floor of the House, voting, the conductaing of 
hearings, and the preparation of committee reports. 
The definition of legislative acts has a strong 
geo,graphical flavor--legislative acts must, seemingly, 
be done within the walls of Congress. 
3, The class of nonlegis8tive acts includes 
at least~rivate republication of documents, 
(i) 
United States v. Gravel, 408 u.s. 606; the gathering of ------
informat~n if done outside the walls of Congress, 
Gravel, at 626; the physical or constructively physical 
~~) 
l~ b~rring of would-be members from the House, Powell v. 
@) -
McCormack, 395 u.s. 486; the a~resting of private 
citizens found in comtempt, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 ------- ~) 
u.s. 168; anJ5'dealings with the Executive brcreh, 
United States v. Johnson, 383 u.s. 169. The mere 
fact that "Senators generally perform certain acts 
in their offidal capacity dees not necessarily make 
all such acts legislative in nature", Gravel, at 625. 
The real test of a legislative act is whether it is 
"an integral part of the deliberative and coJIUllunicative 
s 
processes by which Member participate in committee 
1\ 
and House proceedings", Gravel, at 625. 
4. For the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause, 
there is no difference between a Member and an employee 
acting at his direction: 
T -
.. -2--
"None of this, as we see it, involves distinguishing 
between a Senator and his personal aides with 
respect to legislative immunity. In Kilbourn"type 
situations, both aide and Member should b~ immune 
with respect to committee and House action leading 
to the illegal resolution. So too in Eastland, 
as in this litigation, senatorial aides should 
enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct 
committee hearings. On the other hand, no pir ior 
~ casehas held that Members of Congress would be immune 
if they executed an invalid resolution by themselves 
carrying out an illegal arrest, or if, in order 
to secure information for a hearing, themselves 
seized the property or invaded the privacy of 
a citize~." Gravel, at 621. 
While the opinion uses "personal aides" in some places -
and "employees" in others, it is my understanding 
that even ministerial employees are protected when 
performing legisaltive acts. Justice White used 
----- ---Kilbourn, where the employee was a Sergeant-at-Arms, 
and Powell, where the employees were a Clerk and Doorkeeper, 
as examples to support the propoation that all, from 
the Member to the lowliest employee, are to be treated 
alike for Speech ~Debate Clause purposes. 
In practice, however, it turns out that the legislative 
acts are characteristically performed by Jlllllllllllllr 
members and that nonlegislative acts are characteristically ---- --
performed by employees. Thus, in Kilbourn, members 
could not be "questioned" for passing a resolution 
ordering an illegal arrest, but the Seargeant-at-Arms 
could be sued for false arrest; in Powell, members could 
not be questioned for decidmng or voting to exclude 
Adam Clayton Powell from the House, but the Clerk and 
- ... 3--
Rstopped from carrying out the arguably illegal order 
to exclude him. In Dombrowski, Senator Eastland 
could not be questioned for ordering a committee's 
c:o unsel to conduct an investigation, but the counsel 
could be sued for conducting an illegal • search in 
the course of the subsequent investigation. 
5. In the present case, all are imamune from suit 
for preparing the Committee report, "for referring 
the Report that lllllllllllincluded the material 
to the Speaker of the Housep and for voting for 
publication of the report." Draft, at 5. They are 
protected because they were, in the words of Gravel, 
"integral parts of the deliberative and communicative 
processes by which Member participate in committee and 
House proceedings", Draft, at 6. 
Distribution to thel public, on the other hand, 
is not "an integral part etc." Therefore, those who ---carry out that distribution are not protegcted, 
and those persons happen to be the Superintendent of 
Documents and thel Public Printer. In other words, 
the ordering If of the report and the authorizing of 
the report for public distribution are legislative 
actso but the distribution in fact is not a legisaltive 
act. 
Form of Relief in Doe v. McMillan 
l\CK 
February 10, 1973 
This memorandum is addressed to your specific concern 
that the Superintendent of Documents and the Public 
Printer not be held personally liable in damages. 
At the outset, I should mention that Justice White 
does not seem to be at all concerned about this, because 
he does not think that the petitioner's will have the 
proverbial snmvball 's chance in hell on remand. He 
seems to think that petitioners' constitutl:ional 
claims(Constantineau--public infamy without due process; 
violation of right to privacy) are terribly weak and 
that their common law libel action will fail because 
the statements in the report are probably true. For 
these reasons, he is not particularly concerned about 
the form of relief. The reason he woted the waay he 
did was, I think, that he simply wanted to slap 
the hands of Congress for doing such a stupid and insensitive 
thi~. 
On thet merits of the relief question, three 
---------··~--~---
items seem to me to be worth discussing1 1) the 
present draft's treatment of relief; 2) the treatment 
in prior Speech or Debate Clause cases of damage 
claims against ministerial employees; and 3) the 
present posture of the case. 
I. 
The present draft outlines on page 3 the ~rayer 
~ ' 
- .. 2 .. -
of the complaint, The prayer sought 1)an injunction 
against fultrther distirbution; 2) a re4call of 
copies already distrmbuted and excision of the 
children's names; and 3) compensatory t and punitive 
damages, 
At footnote 5 on page four, the draft points out 
that the CA "independently found that injunctive relief 
would not issue because of assurances from the 
federal defendants that no republication or further 
distribution of the Report was contemplated," On 
page 10, the draft repeats the substance of the footnote 
and then statesa 
But this left the question whether any part of 
the previous publication and public disttibution 
by respondents other than the Members of Congress 
and Committee personnel went beyond the limits of 
the legisative immunity provided by the Speech 
or Debate Clause,,,," 
Finally, the draft closes with this paragraph: 
Of course, like the Court of Appeals, we 
indicate nothing as to whether petitioners have 
pleaded a good cause of action or whether respondents 
have other defenses, cons~itutional or otherwise, 
We have dealt only with the threshold question of 
immunity." at 16-17. 
While of course none of this precludes the lower 
courts from issuing injunctions against further distribution, 
it basically treatts that question as a closed one. 
By implication, the remaining possibilities are 
1) recall and excision; and 2) damages, By reserving 
the effect of "other defenses", the draft leaves open 
--3--
the question whether the Printer and the Superintendent 
might defend anly damage claim by asserting lack of 
knowledge or lack of malice. 
II. 
On the basis of a fairly quick search, I have 
discovered only two of this Court's cases which bear --
directly on the question whether damages may 
-.. ...____.._.,_ ... ----...... ---.. - _..--..-~--~-·--
levied aga:imt an employee acting under orders 
'------ ---------
from the! House, In Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, 
the siirgeant-at-Arms of the House arrested and detained 
for forty-five days a witness whom the House had ~y 
resolution declared to be in contempt. The 
wiat•ness brought a damage action agaisnt the 
<:5!,.. 
Members of the House and the ~geant-at-Arms. 
This court upheld the dismissal of tha action as 
against the Members, but reversed the dismissal 
~ 
as against the the ~geant-At-Arms, and remanded 
for further proceedings. The case would seem to ---- -----
stand for the proposition that a claim for damages 
~------------·- - --------against a nondiscretionary employee may at least ---- -----
survive a motion to dismiss on Speech or Debate ---------· ~-----
Clause grounds. 
In Powellll v. McCormack, supra, Adam Clayton 
Powell sued Members of the House and the Clerk and 
Doorkeeper for refusing to seat him in the 90th 
Congress. By the time the case reached this 
,. . 
--4--
Court, Powell had been seated in thel 91 st Congress, 
and it was manifestly too late to issue an injunction 
to seat him in the 90th Congress. The Court 
held that the case was not moot, dismissed the 
action as against the Members on the ground• that 
they were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, 
but remanded the action as against the Clerk and 
--------------------~ ~----~----
Doorkeeper, stating: ______., 
' Petitioners seek additional forms of equitable 
relief, including mandamus for the release of 
petitioner Powell's back pay, 
In short, the major issue keeping the case alive 
was the issue of Powell's right to back pay. 
Justice..._ Stewart, dissenting, 
I 
pointed out that the Sargeant-A~-Arms was no longer 
in possession of funds from which to pay salaries 
for the 90th Congress. 
Powell is perhaps a less strong peecedent 
for leaving open the question of damages than 
is Kilbourn, primarily because the method by which 
Powell sought to obtain payment was mandamus--
if there was no fund which the employees of the House 
could tap to pay his back salary, then it would 
simply not be :P>aid. In other words, the employees 
of the House would on no ac~nt have been personally 
liable. Of course, Powell might have rephrased his 
complaint as an action for damages rather than for 
~ --5--
mandamus. Under Kilbourn, he would have surmounted 
the difficulty of the absence of funds. 
Perh~s the clearest moral to be drawn from 
these cases is not that ministerial employees 
may be held for damages when they act withih the 
scope of their orde.rs, but simply that the Court 
is loathe to deal with subsidiary questions in 
a Speech or Debate Clause case. This may de~ive 
from the expectation that once rights have 
been declared and claims of immunity repudiated, 
Congress will take the next step to repcir the 
damage. Perhaps, on the other hand, the Court 
has recog"i1i'zed that as a•· pra~tic.a\ matter, the 
Congress will appropriate money to reimburse 
any ministerial employee found liable in the course 
of his delegated responsibilities. 
III. 
As to the present case, I presently think that 
the bewt approach is not to decide whether the 
Printer and the Superintendent may be held liable 
-----------------·------------for damages. I would, rather, take the edge off -of Justice White's assertion that the request 
~ 
for prosp*ective injunctive relief is dead. The \ ~ ~ 
question of what relief is appropriate would thus 
be left totally unsettled 1 all three p*ossibilities--~ 
p~~ctive~njunctive relief, recall and excision, and .....__/ 
--6--
damages--would be left open. I think that there 
is justification for leaving open the propriety 
of pros~ective injunctive relief in the summary nature 
of the proceedings bel•ow. We would not have to 
overrule theCA on the point, but could simply 
state ... that the question should not be 
settled without an evidaentiary hearing. This 
could, I thi·nk, be done with a light touch. 
A final point, There is, perhaps, some danger -
in leaving open the possibility of injunctive relief. 
-----------------------------------------------Apart fr>om the affromt to Congress, such an injunction 
would be a prior restraint, and while the Court 
------~~~-------------has not explored in any detail the raationship of 
the Firs~ Amendment to government publicationand 
distribution, that problem lurks in the background. 
But agai'np there is no reason to drop the draft 8 s 
notation that respondents may have"other defenses, 
------~----------------------cc---~ --------constitutional or other~wise." -----
/ 
General Comments 
Doe v. McMilltn(Draft opinion of White, J.) 
February 10, 1973 
\\CK 
In two other memos, I have att~ted to delineate 
Justice White's view of the Speech or Debate Clause 
and to address your concern over holding the 
Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents 
liable for damages. In this memo, I will offer 
my general comments about the draft opinion. 
I. 
The greatest danger I see in this opinion is 
that it will further weaken the Speech or Detate 
clause in contexts other than the present one. 
In particular, I am concerned that it may further 
weaked the Congress vis-a-vis the Executive. 




"it is apparent • from the history of the clause~r~ 
that the privilege was not born primarily ------
of a desire to avoid private suits • • • 
but rather to prevent intimidation by the 
executive and accountability before a possibly 
hostile judiciary." 
My reading of contemporary affairs is that the danger 
of intimidation by the executive is far greater 
than the danger of interference by the judiciary, 
at least inso as the latter phrase refers not 
r· CJ..I"e /n 1m orhl! e.s ~'}~ C.JI'tder E"Yt:"ce;.f;u e co.., fll'b ~ 
to criminal trials and grand juries but to private 
'-
suits for the redress of private rights. 
In ~ravel, 408 u.s. 606, the Court allowed 
--2--
grand jury inquiry of the Senator's aides regarding 
"republication" by a private press, Beacon Press, 
a republication which was arranged by a single 
Member of Congress, In a footnote( at 626 ,n.l6), -·----- ..-- ...--...._ 
the Court reserved judgment on another questions 
We need not address issues that may arise when 
Congress or either House, as distinguished from 
a single Member, orders the publication and/or 
public distirbution of committee hearings, 
reports, or other materials." 
Gravel, then, on its facts, was limited to • 
l)private republication 2) at the instance of a 
single member. On its facts, againtll, it does not 
preclude the Congress from getting its message 
to the people by 1) public publication e and. or 
2) at the instance of the Congress as a whole. 
It is my understanding, though I am not certain 
of this, that the PuQlic Printer gets his marching 
orders from Congress as a whole or • from committees 
but not from individual members, In any event, 
I think that if possible the Court should leave 
open whether an employee of the Congress could be 
........... ....-* ............ ~ ..-z .......... ~ • 
called before a grand jury or jubjected to a crim ... inal 
........... -trial for distribution beyond the immediate needs 
of Congress. Additionally, I would if possible leave ----open the question whether at the behest of the Executive 
a court could enjoin dist~rbution to the public of 
a committee report. 
--3--
One possible way to do so would 
distinguish between mere wrongful or 
distribution on the one hand and distribution 
which infringes on the constitutional rights of 
individuals on the other. On this analysis, 
Members and employees would be absolutely 
privileged to distribute to the public through 
'~ . -
the Public Printer insofar as criminal penalties, 
grand jury testimony, and injunctions sought by 
the executive are concerned, put not privile~ed 
to distribute to the public insofar as actions brought 
by private citizens for violations of their 
constitutional rights are concerned, 
In Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F.Supp. 1183(D.D.C. 
1970, plaintiffs sought to enjoin republication of 
a list of speaket1 whom the House Committee on 
" Internal Secu~ty thought to be subversive. 
Relief was granted against the Printer and the 
Superintendent on the ground that the republication 
infringed on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 
l 
Hentoff, then, provides some support for the positi'On 
I suggest. 
Another version of the privilege \llUld have it 
fall to the side not just when a private individual's constitutinal 
rights are violated,) but also when any other of his 
rights are violated, whether or not those are constitutional 
--4--
ones. In McGovern v. Martz, 182 F.Supp. 343k(D.D.C. 1960), 
the court stated in dictum that republication 
merited only a qualified privilege in a libel action. 
The privilege is "qualified" in the sense that 
a private citizen can recover only if he can show 
malice. The Restatement of Torts 590, commen«t B 
(1938) takes the same position and is quoted in 
McGovern, 182 F.Supp. at 347. As the Court stated 
in Tenney v. Brandhove, 
"This Court has not hesitated to sustain the 
rights of private individuals when if found 
Congress was acting outside its legiaative 
roo." 341 u.s., at 377. 
To recapitulate, I would like to see the Court --------
distinguish as regards 
1
i uthorized public republicatio~'"' 
between situations where the Congress has inflicted 
-------------------------------------~------------iru]ury on individuals and situations where it has 
----------~- ~ 
not but has simply offended the Executive or the 
--------------~--------- -- ~
Judiciary. The line might be drawn at the violation 
~
of constitutional rights or might include as well 
violations of the "right not to be libeled" if that 
right does not have constitutional dimensions. 
The distinction would not have to be drawn 
with a heavy hand, but it should at least be made 
clear that the case would be wholly different if 
the Printer were being prosecuted or called before 
a grand jury or throttled by an agency. 
lit ! 
--5--
I acknowledge that this cuts somewhat against 
the grain of Gravel's theme that the Clause 
has the same meaning for all persons in all contexts, 
but you did not write Gravel and few people seem to 
be able to understand it 
II. 
I am bothered a bit by the invitation(on 
"-------------
page 15) to Congress to extend legislative 
- ......-- -------·------' 
immunity to the public printer and the superintlendent -- --
of documents. In Gravel, p 624, n. 15, Justice _ ........ _ . .... ~ .. .__ .,/" 
White states: 
"The eourt in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
367, 376-377(1951), was equally clear that 
'legislative activity' is not all-encompassing, 
nor may its limits be established by the 
Legislative Branch. 'Legislatures may not of 
course acquire power by an unwarranted extension 
of privilege, The House of Commons' 
claim of power to establish the limits of its 
privilege has been little more than a pretense 
since Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id. 320." 
While the present draft treats official immunity 
as something separate from the Speech or Debate 
Clause privilege, in the end it finds the two 
privileges coextensive. See page 16. I had thought 
that the Court was appalled when Judge Aldrich 
in Gravel spoke in terms of a common law privilege 
separable from the Speech or Debate Clause. In 
any event, an extension of official immunity, like 
an extension of the Speech or Debate elause, 
would I think raise considerable if not insurmountable 
- .. 6--
constitutional problems. I would drop the invitation. 
III. 
In general, as we have discussed, the opinion is 
hard to follow. If, ultimately, you join the 
opinion, we can probably suggest two or three 
changes to sharpen the discussion. But I will 
not try to suggest them now until you decide 





Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: February 19, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6356 Doe v. McMillan 
I have now reviewed your three memos, which have contributed 
significantly to my education although I remain uncertain both as to the 
exact state of the present law and precisely where I am willing to go in 
this case. 
The purpose of this memo is to summarize, in conclusory terms, 
my understanding of a possible position which you think has some merit. 
The position would incorporate the following points, although not 
necessarily in the order stated: 
1. Accept White's distinction between action that is legislative 
and nonlegislative. 
2. Members of Congress and their aides (employees) are 
protected by the privilege of the Speech and Debate Clause from all 
consequences of the legislative act of publication where this is an integral 
part of the "deliberative and communicative processes" within the Congress. 
3. Republication for the purpose of general public dissemination 
whether privately or by the Public Printer pursuant to congressional or 
committee authorization, is not a part of the legislative process. 
2. 
4. The type of republication specified in 3 above would not be 
privileged as against the assertion of a private right of action where the 
complainant asserts either deprivation of a constitutional right or a 
personal injury. 
5. We would leave open, as not being before the Court, the question 
whether such republication would be privileged as against Executive 
Branch action seeking imposition of criminal penalties, compelling 
testimony before a grand jury, or seeking injunctive relief. (I am aware, 
Bill, that you would like to draw a line between private rights and Executive 
conduct, but perhaps we should go no further than making it clear that this 
is a different question). 
6. There is no privilege, under Gravel, for republication by an 
individual member of Congress whether it be through private or government 
printing office channels. 
7. The Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, when 
acting upon instructions from the Congress or one of its Committees, are 
in the same posture as an employee (or aide) of a member or a Committee. 
(Bill: I am not sure this is your thought, but so understand it). 
8. If the foregoing points are sound, Complainants in this case 
may assert a cause of action against both the members of Congress and 
the Printer and the Superintendent of Documents with respect to 
3. 
republication to the extent that such was not a part of the legislative 
process. 
9. The relief sought by Complainants includes: (i) injunction; 
(ii) recall and excision; and (iii) compensatory and punitive damages. 
Although the CA found that injunctive relief was not an issue because of 
assurances of no further republication, no evidence was taken. Justice 
White apparently accepts the view that injunctive relief is out of the 
case, and would remand to determine whether the Printer and Superintendent 
may be held liable for damages. Bill Kelly suggests a remand, leaving 
open for further consideration by the lower court .of all categories of 
requested relief. 
* * * * * 
Additional Comment: 
As I read Bill's memoranda, he would allow a private action 
against both members and employees even for duly authorized republica-
tion. Although perhaps not controlling, what about Kilbourn and Powell v. 
McCormick? In the former, a private person was arrested and detained 
for 45 days when the House held him in contempt. Invoking their privilege, 
members of the House were dismissed from the suit, which was allowed 
to proceed against the Sergeant at Arms. It can be argued that the 
citation for contempt was clearly a legislative act, whereas as republication 
by the Public Printer for public dissemination (rather than congressional 
4. 
use) is not a legislative act. Nevertheless, we would certainly be 
venturing into "stormy seas" - to put it mildly - if we held that members 
of Congress were liable personally for damages for the republication 
a nd dissemination of a document pursuant to official Congressional or 
Committee action. Also, what about Sullivan v. New York Times and its 
relevance? If Sullivan is available in a libel suit, should there be a 
difference if the private action were framed as a constitutional violation 
of the right of privacy? 
Let us discuss this perplexing case further at. an early opportunity. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
£;npmu.t ~ou.rt of tire 'Jilnit.t~ .§tatt.s 
';wrullftnghm, 8). <!f. 2G.;l'~.;l 
February 20, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6356 -Doe v. McMillan 
Dear Bill: 
Because I have gotten absolutely no-
where with what I have circulated in this case, 
and because there should be some progress, I 
suggest you reassign the matter to someone else 
on our side · who might bring us together. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to: Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell 
~lt.prtntt <!Jcttrt of tift ~ni±tb' ~tatts 
~asJri:ngton. :!3. <.q. 2!1,?'1-~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS February 20, 1973 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your opinion in 
Noo 71-6356 - Doe Vo McMillano 
Mro Justice White 
cc: Mro Justice Brennan 
Mro Justice Marshall 
Mro Justice Powell 
·~.! .. ·:::~·~ .. ..- ~~···., · . ~~·· · ... · ., ·· '7"''1J·.,.~~ .. ,... 
: ·;~~\~. /.. "'.' 'r•"",J ~ ,. 
·k.'.. . 
~;~· -•~-,...-,.;·n,p '"t ~ 













February 20, 19 73 
Re: No. 71-6356 - Doe v. McMillan 
Dear Bill: 
This refers to Byron's letter of February 20. 
My failure to respond to Byron's circulation does not mean that 
I think it should be abandoned. 
The truth is, I have been giving priority to other things and have 
not done the work on this case that I had expected to do. The case is a 
most puzzling one for me. I was - and still am - dismayed by the result 
in the Court of Appeals which offers no prospect of relief to persons in the 
position of these complainants. Yet, I must say that up until now I am not 
clear in my own mind as to a principled basis for granting relief consistent 
with our prior decisions. 
I may end up agreeing that Byron has the best answer. Certainly 
I have no better answer. I see no great harm in allowing this case to stay 
on the "back burner" for a while longer. It is even possible, I suppose, that 
the Congress itself might grant some of the requested relief. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
LFP, Jr. :psf 
cc: Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




TO: Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr. DATE: February 27, 1973 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
·7,.; ~~ 'i.t 
ii ... .~ 
l>:, 'i>'Jl 
'!l 1~1~~ Re: No. 71-6356 Doe v. McMillan 
" Now that Justice White has dirculated a draft opinion for the 
Court, I would prefer not to come out with a competing opinion. ' 
' Please explore two possibilities: ( i) an opinion concurring in 
Justice White's opinion, but adding my own gloss to it for purposes of 
clarification; or (ii) suggest specific changes in his opinion which might 
make it a little more understandable. :~·' 
I am not entirely satisfied with any result so far discussed either 
by you and me (on the basis of your memos), or in the White and Douglas>' 
opinions. Least of all I am dissatisfied with the result of the Court of 
., •. ;;.: t'i~ ' '·'·•'' 
,{i 
Appeals of the District of Columbia. There may be some middle ground 
'''>~#:·' 
between Justice White's conclusion and that which you have been inclined 
to favor . 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~u.prttnc ~curt cf t~ c ';l1nitcb ~tatcs 
';Wa.alyingtctt, p. <!J. 2!1~>1~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL February 27, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6356 - Doe v. McMillan 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 







To: The Chief' Justice 
t_j, f Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice St ewart 
~~~ 
Mr. Justice Mar shall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
v-Mf . Justice Powell 14, \AA_:1J~ l' " Jt1stice Rehnquist .:. ..L. . 
Fr om : White, J. 
2nd DRAFT 
Ci r culated: ____ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ecircula ted: 2 .::... "-f_~_z.L 
No. 71-6356 
John Doe et al, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
John L. McMillan et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
[February -, 1~73] 
I 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case concerns the scope of congressional immunity 
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, as well as the reach of 
official immunity, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(1959), particularly in the legislative context, see Tenney 
v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). 
By resolution adopted February 5, 1969, H. R. Rep. No. 
76, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong Rec. 2784, the House 
of Representatives authorized the Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia or its subcommittee "to conduct a full 
and complete investigation and study of ... the organi-
zation, management, operation, and administration" of 
any department or agency of the government of the 
District of Columbia or of any independent agency or 
instrumentality of government operating solely in the 
District of Columbia. The committee was given sub-
poena power and was directed to "report to the House 
as soon as practicable ... the results of its investiga-
tion and study together with such recommendations as 
it deems advisable." On December 8, 1970, a Special 
Select Subcommittee of the Committee on the District 
of Columbia submitted to the Speaker of the House a 
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report, H. R. Rep. No. 91-1681, 91st Cong., 2cl Sess. 
(1970), represented to be a summary of the Subcom-
mittee's investigation and hearings devoted to the pub-
lic school system of the District of Columbia. On the 
same day, the report was referred to the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union and was 
ordered printed. 116 Cong. Rec. H 11347. Thereafter, 
the report was pripted and distributed by the Govern-
ment Printing Office pursuant to 44 U. S. C. ~~ 501 and 
701. 
The 450-page report included among its supporting 
data some 45 pages that are the gravamen of petitioners' / 
suit. Included in the pertinent pages were copies of1 
absence sheets. lists of absentees, copies of test papers, 
and documents relating to disciplinary problems of cer-
tain specifically-named students.' The report stated 
that these materials \vere included to "give a realistic 
vie,y" of a troubled school and "the lack of administra-
tive efforts to rectify the multitudinous problems there," 
to show the level of reading ability of seventh graders 
who were given a fifth-grade history test, and to illus-
trate suspension and clisci:plinary problems." 
On January 8, 1971, petitioners, under pseudonyms, 
brought an action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia on behalf of themselves, their 
children, and all other children and parents similarly 
situated. The named defendants were ( 1) the Chair-
1 Thr Court of Appr:1ls' opinion trrms t hr m:1 trrials ··~omrwhat 
drro!ol::ttor~· ." Thr ah~rntrr li~ts nnmrd st uc!Pnt,.: who \H'rr fn'quent 
''el:t,.:.,; <"11ltC'r~." Of tho 2!) 1Pst p::qlC'rs published in thr rPport, 21 
borr failing gradrs: all imluclrd thr namr ol' thr studrnt bc·ing tf'~trcl. 
Thr lrtt rr:-;, mrmorancln, and othrr do<"unwnts rrlating to disc·iplinary 
problrm:;; clctailrcl rondurt of ~prcifieall~· n:mwd ~tudrnt:;. Some of 
t hr dr,·i:mt conduct clrseribPcl inYolYrcl sc•xual prn·er,ion :1 nd c-rim-
inal Yiola t io11s. 
" ThC' informa1ion waH obt:1inpcl ,·oluntnril~· from Distriet of Co-
lumbia srhool pPrRonnd by Committrr ill\ · r~ti~ator:-;. 
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man and Members of the House Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia; (2) the Clerk. Staff Director, alld 
Counsel of the Committee; (3) a consultant and an in-
vestigator for the Committee; ( 4) the Superintendent 
of Documents ancl the Publlc Printer; ( 5) the Presi-
dent and members of the Board of Education of the 
District of Colmnbia; (6) the Rupcrintcnclcnt of Public 
Rchools of the District of Columbia; (7) the principal of 
Jefferson High School and one of the teachers at that 
school; and (8) the United States of America. 
Petitioners alleged that, by disclosing, disseminating, 
ancl publishing the information contained in the report, 
the defendants had violated the petitioners' and their 
children's statutory, constitutional. and common law 
rights to privacy and that such publication had caused 
and would cause grave damage to the children's mental 
and physical health and to their reputations, ood names, 
and future careers. Petitioners also alleged various vio-
lations OflOcal law. Petitioners further charged that 
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute 
and publish information concerning plaintiffs, their 
. children and other students." The complaint prayed for 
!QJ an order enjoining the c.lefcndan ts from further J publica-
tion, dissemination, and distribution of ar~_,rcport con-
taining the objectionable material and fm~n order re-
calling the reports to the extent practicable, and deleting 
the objectionable material fron~ report already in 
circulation. Petitioners also ask~r compensatory and 
punitive damages." 
The District Court, after a hearing on motions for 
a temporary restraining order and for an order against 
"The prnyer nlso inrludccl a req11e~t for an injunction prohibiting 
future cli~rlosure of "confidential information" nnd requiriug the Dis-
t rirt of Columbia School Bonrcl "to pstabli~h rule~ nnd regulations 
rrgnrding thr ronfidrntiality of srhool paper~ nnd the right of pri1·ary 
of students in the ~rhools of the District of Columbia." 
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further distribution of the report, dismissed tho action 
agaillst thE' individual clefenda!lts on tho grou11d that 
the conduct complained of was absolutely privileged.1 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Without 
determining whether tho complaint stated a cause of 
action under the Constitution or any applicable law, the 
majority held that the Members of Congress, the Com-
mittee staff employees, and the Public Printer and Super-
intendent of Documents were immune from the liability 
asserted against them because of the Speech and Debate 
Clause and that the official immunity doctrine recognized 
in Barr v. 111 at teo barred any liability on the part of the 
District of Columbia officials as well as the legislative 
ernployees.fi We granted certiorari, 408 U. S. 922. 
I 
To "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Execu-
tive and accountability before a possible hostile judici-
ary," GravelY. United States, 408 U.S. 606,617 (1972), 
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides that "for 
any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Members 
of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place." 
"The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to ~ 
a co-equal branch of the government-wide 
freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without 
4 The District Court al~o di~missed the suit again~;t the United 
States for failure to exhaust administratiYe remedies. 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2675 (a). That ruling il:l not challenged here. 
5 The Court of AppealH nl~;o independently found thnt injunctive- I 
relief would not issue because of assurances from the frurral del'rnd-
ants that no re ublicatiou or further distributwn o t 1r Report was 
co~d. With respect to pet1 wners' reque~t for injunctive 
relief against the District of Columbia ofiicinls, the Court found that, 
because of the adoption of new policies concerning confidential infor-
mation, "there is no substnntial threat of future injury to npprllants." 
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intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. 
It thus protects Members against prosecutions that 
directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative 
process." Gravel v. United States, supra, at 616. 
The Speech and Debate Clause has been read "broadly 
to effectuate its purposes," United States v. J ohnsonr 
383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966); Gravel v. United States, supra, 
at 624, and includes within its protections anything· 
"generally done il;-a session of the House by one of its 
members in relation to tl1e business before it." Kilbourn 
Y. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 204 (1880); United States 
Y. Johnson, supra, at 179; Gravel v. United States, supra, 
at 624. Thus "yog1~g by Members and committee re-
ports are protected" and "a Member's conduct at legisla-
tive committee hearings, although subject to judicial 
review ii1 various circumstances, as is legislation itself, 
may not be made the basis for a civil or criminal judg-
men_!, against a Member b~e that conduct is \vithin 
the 'sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' " Ibid. 
Without belaboring the matter further, it is plain to 
\!;S that ~mplaint in this case was barred by the 
S eech or Debate Clause insofar as it sought relief from 
the Congr~-committee members, rom the commit-
tee staff, from the consultant, or from the investigator, 
for introdu~at committee heanngs tli.at 
identified particular individuals, for referring the Report 
that included the material to the Speaker of the House, 
a;}d"Tor ting for publication 'of the report. Doubtless, 
also, a QUblishe report may, wit out losing Speech and 
Debate Clause protection, be distributed to and used 
fo_r le~tive purposes by Members of Congress, con-
gressional committees, and institutional or individual 
legislative functionaries. At least in these respects, the 
actions upon which petitioners sought to predicate lia-
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bility were "legislative acts," Gravel v. United Slates, 
supra, at 618, and, as such, were immune from suit." 
Petitioners argue that including in the record of the 
hearings m;d - in the Report itself materials describing 
particular conauct onthe part of identified children was 
actionable because unnecessary and irrelevant to any 
legislative purpose. Cases in this Court, however, from 
Kilbourn to Gravel pretermit ,the irqposition of liability 
on any such theory. Congressmen and their aides are 
immune from liability for their actions within the "legis-
lative sphere," id., at 624-625, even though their con-
duct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, 
would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary 
to criminal or civil statutes. Although we might disagree 
with the Committee as to whether it was necessary or 
even remotely useful to include the names of individual 
children in the evidence submitted to the Committee and 
in the Committee Report, \Ye have no authority to 
oversee the judgment of the Committee in this respect 
or to impose liability on them if we disagree with their 
legislative judgment. The acts of authorizing an investi-
gation pursuant to which the subject materials were 
gathered, the acts of holding hearings where the ma-
teriaJs \vere presented, preparing a Report where they 
were reproduced, and authorizing the publication and 
distribution of that Report where "all integral part[s] 
of the deliberative and communicative processes by which 
Members participate in committee and House proceed-
ings with respect to the consideration and passage or 
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other 
matters which the Constitution places within the juris-
"In Grauel, we held that ·'the 8perch and Debate Clau:.;e applirs 
not onl~· to a l\1rmber but also to hi~ nick~ insofnr a:-; the conduct 
of the IMtrr would be n protected legi~lativl' nrt if prrformPd by 
1 he !vlembrr himsrlf." Gravel "· United State:;, -lOS U. 8., nt fllR. 
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diction of either House.' ' !d., at 625. As such, the acts 
'"ere protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. 
Our cases make perfectly apparent, however, that 
ev.gr~thin_g a Member of Congress may rc~ly doTs 
not a legislative act within the protection of the Speech 
or Debate l1aul"e. "rTJhe Clause has not been ex-
tended beyond the legislative sphere," and "[l] egislative 
acts are not all-encompassing." !d., at 624-625. Mem-
bers of Congress may frequently be in touch with and 
seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government, 
but this conduct "though generally done, is not pro-
tected legislative activity." I d., at 625; United Slates v. 
Johnson, supra. Nor docs the Speech and Debate Clause 
protect a private republication of documents introduced 
and made public at a. committee hearing, although the 
hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative proc-
ess. Gravel v. United Stales, supra. 
The proper scope of our inquiry, therefore, is whether 
1mblic distributions of allegedly actionable material are 
l~gislative acts~tected by the Speech and Deb~ 
Clause when, the distributions arc authori7.cd by Con-
grcsR. The respondent insists that such public distribu-
tions arc protcc.ted, that the Clause immuni7.es not only 
publication for the information and use of Members in 
the performance of their legislative duties but also must 
be held to protect ''publications to the public through 
the facilities of Congress." Public dissemination, it is 
argued, will serve "the important legislative function of 
informing the public concerning matters pending before 
Congress .... " Brief for Legislative Respondents, p. 27. 
We do not doubt the importance of informing the 
public about the business of Congress. However, the 
question remains whether the act of doing so, simply 
because authorized by Congress, must always be con-
sidered "an integral part of the deliberative and com-
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municative processes by which Members participate in 
committee and House proceedings" with respect to legis-
lative or other matters before the House. Gravel v. 
United States, supra, at 625. A Member of Congress 
may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's 
stand in his home district, and clearly the Speech and 
Debate Clause 'vould not protect such an act even though 
the libel was read from an official committee report.7 
The reason is that republishing a libel under such cir-
cumstances is not an essential part of the legislative proc-
ess and is not part of that deliberative process "by 'vhich 
members participate in committee and House proceed-
ings." Ibid. By the same token, others, such as the 
Superintendent of Documents or the Public Printer or 
legislative personnel, who participate in distributions of 
actionable material beyond ~asonable bounds of the 
legislative task, enjoy no Speech and Debate Clause 
immunity. 
Members of Congress are themselves immune for order-
ing or vOting for a publica lon gomg be oncl the reason-
able requirements of the legislative function, Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, supra, but the Speech and Debate Clause 
no more insulates legis1ative functionaries carrying out 
such nonlegislative directives than it protected the ser-
geant-at-arms in Kilbourn v. Thompson when, at the 
direction of the House, he made an arrest that the courts 
subsequently found to be "without authority." !d., at 
200. The Clause does not protect "criminal conduct 
threatening the security of the person or property of 
others, whether performed at the direction of the Senator 
in preparation for or in execution of a legislative act or 
7 The republication of a libel, in circumstances whrre 1hr initial 
publication is privileged, is generally unprotected. Srr gcnernlly 
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 5.18 (1956); Pro~::;cr, TortR, 
766-769 (4th ed. 1971). See al·o Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S., 
at 622-627. 
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done without his knowledge or direction." Gravel v. 
United States, supra, at 622. Neither, we think, does it 
immunize those "·ho publish and distribute otherwise 
actionable materials beyond the reasonable requirements 
of the legislative function. 
Thus we cannot accept the prol2_osition that in order 
to jJerform- itslegislativeful1clion Congress not only must 
at times ~lsidcr ~onable material but also -must be free to disseminate it to the public at large, no· 
matter ho'v injurious to private reputation that m-;.:-
terial might be. We cannot believe that the purpose of 
th~to prevent intimidation of legislators by 
the Executive and accountability before a possibly hos-
tile judiciary," id., at 617-will suffer in the slightest if 
it is held that those who, at the direction of Congress 
or otherwise, distribute actionable material to the pub- I. _ J-~ 
lie at large have no ~utomatic immunity m;~ -fv r;- ~ 
Speech and Debate Clause but must respond_,.\ w the ~ 
extent that others must respond in light of the Consti-
tution and ap Jlicable laws. To hold otherwise would 
e to invite gratuitous injurY, · for little if any public 
purpose~ We are unwilling to sanction such a result, at 
least absent more compelling evidence that, in order to 
perform its legislative function , Congress must not only 
inform the public about the fundamentals of its business 
but also must' pweli:sl¥ d!strib.uteA/~B'PrH5rti~ materials 
otherwise actionable under local law. • . 
That the Speech and Debate Clause h~s finite li!nits is 
important for present purposes. The complaint before 
us alleges that the respondents caused the committee 
report "to be distributed to the public," that "distribu-
tion of the report continues to the present," and that 
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute 
and publish" damaging information about petitioners and 
their children. It does not expressly appear from the 
com.plaint, nor is it contended in this Court, that either 
71-6i35G-0P1NION 
10 DOl~ v. McMILLAN 
tho Members of Congress or the Committee personnel did 
anything more than conduct tho hearings, prepare the 
Report, and authorize its publication. As we have stated, 
such acts by those respondents are protected by tho 
Speech and Debate Clause and may not serve as a 
predicate for a suit. The complaint was therefore 
properly dismissed as to these respondents. Other re-
spondents, however, are alleged to have carried out a 
public distribution and to be ready to continue such 
dissemination. 
In response to those latter allegations, the Court of Ap-
peals, after receiving sufficient assurances from the re-
spondents that they had no intention of seeking a repub-
lication or carrying out further distribution of the report, 
concluded that thoro was no basis for injunctive relief. 
But this loft the question whether any part of the previ-
ous p{]'EJicatwn and pt1blic diS'ti1.bution by respo1-Kients 
ohler than the Members of Congress and Committee per-
sonnel went beyond tho limits of the legislative immunity 
provided by the Speech and Debate Clause of tho Con-
stitution. Until that question was resolved, the com-
plaint should not have boon dismissed on threshold im-
munity grounds) unless tho Court of Appeals was correct 
in ruling that the action against the other respondents 
was foreclosed by the doctrine of official immunity, a 
question to which '"o now turn. 
II 
The official immunity doctrine, which "has in large 
part been of judicial making." )3arr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 
564, 569 (1959), confers immunity on government offi-
cials of suitable ran for the reason that "officials of 
govcmment should be free to exorcise their dutiE>s unem-
barrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts 
done in the course of those duties-suits ·which would 
consume time and energies which would otherwise be 
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devoted to governmental service and the threat of which 
might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effec-
tive administration of policies of Government." I d., at 
571.s The official immunity doctrine seeks to reconcile 
two important considerations-
"[O]n the one hand, the protection of the individual 
citizens against pecuniary damage caused by oppres-
sive or malicious action on the part of officials of 
the Federal Government; and on the other, the pro-
tection of the public interest by shielding responsible 
governmental officers against the harassment and 
inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded dam-
age suits brought on account of action taken in the 
exercise of their official responsibilities." I d., at 565. 
In the Barr case, the Court reaffirmed existing immu-
nity law but made it clear that the immunity conferred 
might not be the same for all officials for all purposes. 
!d., at 573; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 
378; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967). 
Judges. like executive officers with discretionary func-
tions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of 
their motive or good faith. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 
569; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967). But 
policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more 
limited privilege. I d., at 555-558. Also, the Court de-
termined in Barr that the scope of immunity from 
defamation suits should be determined by the relation 
of the publication complained of to the duties entrusted 
to the officer. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 573-574; see also 
the companion case, Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593, 
597-598 ( 1959). The scope of immunity has always 
~Both brforr and aftrr Ba,T. official immunity has been held ap-
plicable to officials of the Lrgislati,·e Branch. Sec 'Tenney Y. Brand-
hove. 3.J.1 U. S. 307 (1951); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. SZ 
( 1907). 
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been tied to the "scope of authority." W heeldin v. 
Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963). In the legislative 
context, for instance, " [ t] his Court has not hesitated 
to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found 
Congress was acting outside its legislative role." Ten-
ney v. Bran.dhove, supra, at 377. Thus, we have recog-
nized "the immunity of legislators for acts within the 
legislative role," Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554 ( 1967), 
but have carefully confined that immunity to protect 
only acts within "the sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra., at 376. 
Because the Court has not fashioned a fixed, invariable 
rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry 
into whether the contributions of immunity to effective 
government in particular contexts outweighs the perhaps 
recurring harm to individual citizens, there is no ready-
made answer as to whether the remaining federal re--- ---- , spo~-the Public Printer and the Superil1tendent of 
Documents-should be accorded absolute immunity in 
this gg.s.e. Of course, to tlie extenfthat they serve legis-
lative functions the performance of which would be im-
mune conduct if done by congressmen, these officials 
enjoy the protection of the Speech and Debate Clause. 
Ol}r inQ.1liry here, however, is whether, if they participate 
in publication and distributiOn beyond the legislative 
sphere,a:ncfthus beyond the protection of the Speech and 
Dei);1e Clause, they a;; nevertneless protected by the 
doctrme of official1mmunitY." Our start1ng pomt is at 
least a rrlliiimum fa.nuTiarity with their functions and 
duties. 
The statutes of the United States create the office of 
Public Printer to manage and supervise the Government 
Printing Office, which, with certain exceptions, is the au-
thorized printer for the various branches of the Federal 
Government. 44 U. S. C. § 301. "Printing and bind-
ing may be done at the Government Printing Office only 
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when authorized by law." § 501. The Public Printer 
is authorized to do printing for Congress, §§ 701-741, 
901-910, as well as for the Executive and Judicial 
Branches of Government, §§ 1101-1123. The Public 
Printer is authorized to appoint the Superintendent of 
Documents with duties concerning the distribution and 
sale of documents. §§ 1701-1722. 
Under the applicable statutes, when either House of 
Congress orders a document printed. the Printer is to 
print the "usual number" unless a greater number is 
ordered. § 701. The "usual number" is 1,682, to be 
divided between bound and unbound copies and dis-
tributed to named officers or offices of the House and 
Senate, to the Library of Congress, and to the Superin--
tendent of Documents for further distribution "to the 
State libraries and designated depositories." lbid.0 
There are also statutory provisions for the printing of 
extra copies, § 702, bills and resolutions, § 706- 708, public 
and private laws, postal conventions, and treaties, § § 709-
712, journals, § 713, the Congressional Directory, § 721-
722, memorial addresses, § 723-724, the Statutes at Large, 
§ 728- 729. Section 733 provides that "[t]he Public-
Printer on order of a Member of Congress, on prepay-
ment of costs, may reprint documents and reports of 
committees together with the evidence papers submitted, 
or any part ordered printed by the Congress." 
With respect to printing for the Executive and Judicial 
Branches, it is provided that "a head of an executive· 
department ... may not cause to be printed, and the 
Public Printer may not print, a document or matter 
unless it is authorized by law and necessary to the public 
business." § 1102 (a) . The executive departments and 
° F or the auLhoriza lion t o supply Huffi rient copies for ~uc h <.liHtri-
but ion ~ce § 73 . The Public Printer is abo required to furni~h the 
Department of State with 20 copies of all congre~sional documents 
and reports. 44 U. S. C. § 715. 
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the courts are to requisition printing by certifying that 
it is "necessary for the public service." § 1103. 
The Superintendent of Documents has charge of the 
distribution of all public documents except those printed 
for use of the executive departments, "which shall be 
delivered to the departments," and for either House of 
Congress, "which shall be delivered to the Senate Service 
Department and House of Representa.tives Publications 
Distribution Service." § 1702. He is thus in charge of 
the public sale and distribution of documents. The Pub-
lic Printer is instructed to "print additional copies of a 
Government publication, not confidential in character, 
required for sale to the public by the Superintendent of 
Documents," subject to regulation by the Joint Commit-
tee on Printing. ~ 1705. 
It is apparent that under this statutory framework, 
the printing of documents and their general distribution 
to the public would be "within the outer perimeter" of 
the statutory duties of the Public Printer and the Super-
intendent of Documents. Barr v. Mateo, supra, at 575. 
Thus, if official immunity e utomafiCafi'Y; l:l_!;taches to any 
conduct~ expressly or implieoly authorized by law, the 
C'Ourt o! Appeals correctly dismissed the cornplaint 
against these officials. This, however, is not the govern-
ing rule. 
"-Tl1e duties of the Public Printer and his appointee, the 
Superintendent of Documents, are to print, handle. dis-
tribute, and sell government documents. The Govern-
ment Printing Office acts as a service organization for 
the branches of the Government. What it prints is pro-
duced elsewhere and is printed and distributed at the· 
direction of the Congress; the departments, the inde11end-
ent agencies and offices, or the Judicial Branch of the· 
Government. The Public Printer and Superintendent 
of Documents exercise discretion only with respect to 
estimating the demand for particular documents and ad-
71-6356-0PINION 
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justing the supply accordingly. The existence of a. Pub-
lic Printer makes it unnecessary for every government 
agency and office to have a printer of its own. The Print-
ing Office is independently created and manned and 
imbued with its own statutory duties; but, we do not 
think that its independent establishment carries with it 
an independent immunity. Rather, the Printing Office 
is immune from suit when it prints for an executive de-
partment for example, only to the extent that it would 
be if it were part of the department itself or, in other 
words, to the extent that the department head himself 
would be immune if he ran his own printing press and 
distributed his own documents. To hold otherwise would 
mean that an executive department could acquire im-
munity for non-immune materials merely by presenting 
the proper certificate to the Public Printer, who would 
then have the duty to print the material. Under such a 
holdillg, the department would have a seemingly fool-
proof method for manufacturing immunity for materials 
which the court would not otherwise hold immune if not 
sufficiently connected with the "official duties" of the 
department. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S., at § 597. 
Congress has conferred no express, statutory immunity I 
on t e Public Printer or the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. Congress has not provided that these officials 
should be immune for printing and distributing materials 
where those who author the materials would not be. 
vV.e thus face no statutory or constitutional problems in l A 
interpreting this doctrine of "judicial making." Barr v. V t 
Matteo, 360 U. S., at 569. We do, however, write in the 
shadow of Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 
U. S. 564 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U. S. 433 (1971), where the Court advised caution 
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him .... " /d., at 437. We conclude that, for 
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the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of im-
mm)ity, the Printer and the Superintendent of Docu-
ments are no more free from suit in the case before us 
than would be a legislative aide who made copies of the 
materials at issue and distributed them to the public at 
tl!e direction of his superiors. See Dombrowski v. East-
lana, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). The scope of inquiry becomes 
equivalent to the inquiry in the context of the Speech 
and Debate Clause, and the answer is the same. The 
business of Congress is to legislate; congressmen and 
aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating. 
But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate 
legislative activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 
376, they enjoy no special immunity from local laws pro-
tecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary 
citizen. 
Because we think the Court of Appeals applied the 
immunities of the Speech and Debate Clause and of the 
doctrine of official immunity too broadly, we must vacate 
its judgment and remand the case for appropriate fur-
ther proceedings.10 We are unaware, from this record, 
of the extent of the publication and distribution of the 
Report which has taken place to date. Thu~ we have 
little basis for judging whether the legitimate legislative 
needs of Congress, and hence the limits of immunity, 
have been exceeded. These matters are for the lower 
courts in the first instance. 
Of course, like the Court of Appeals, we indicate noth- / 
ing as to whether petitioners have pleaded a good cause \ 
of action or whether respondents have other defenses, 
1 0 With respect to the District of Columbin, respondents, the Court 
of Appeals found that they were acting within the Rropc of their 
authority under applicable law and, a~ a result, were immune from 
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constitutional or otherwise. We have dealt only with 
the threshold question of immunity.11 r 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in 
part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to 
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
11 We thus have no occasion to consider Art. I, § 5, cl. 3 which 
requires that "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, 
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as 
may in their Judgment require Secrecy ... "; nor need we deal 
with publications of the Judicial Branch and the legal immunities 
that may be attached thereto. 
Doe v. McMillan, No 71-6a56 
hCK 
March 5, 1973 
I have again reviewed intensively Justice White's 
draft opinion in this case. On last revie'\v, there 
were three points which bothered us: 1) the fact that 
J. White's analysis would seem to allow the Executive 
to stop distribution of materials authorized by the 
Congress to be distributed, and would allow the 
distributors to be called before a grand jury or prosecuted 
for distributing the materials; 2) the scope of relief; 
and 3) the blunt dictum suggesting that Congress could 
confer immunity from suit on its emp• loyees, 
I • 
As to point 1, I have coq:cluded that J. White's 
broad-gauged analysis so pervades pages 7-10 of the 
draft opinion that I cannot "clean it up" for our 
purposes without almost totally re- writing it. 
The basic problem is the phrase lifted from Gravel, 
"an integral part of the deliberative and commu.nnicative 
processes by which Members participate in committee 
~
and House proceedings", an awkward phrase which seems 
..... 
to lace informing the public wholly outside of the 
legislative sphere, 
-~
The pervasiveness of this phrase 
and this analysis leaves 
see it & ne is to write a separate opinion. The other 
-z.. 
is to satisfy ourwelves wit explicitly leaving open 
\ 
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in other sorts of suits. The re~vation of the question 
~- ----- ----
would leave open the possibility of abandoning the 
Gravel phrase in a later case, although of course 
it gains stature every time it is used in a eourt opinion. 
Specifically, you might suggest to Justice White 
that he substitute th~ollowin~ for the first sentence 
.~ 
in the second full paragraph on page eight: 
"The proper scope of our inquiry, therefore, 
is whether the Speech of Debate Clause affords 
absolute immunity from privat~ suit to persons 
who, witn authoLization from Congress, distribute 
materials which allegedly infringe upon the rights 
of individuals." - : 
And you might suggest that he add the following footnote 
after the phrase "applicable laws" in the middle of 
the first full paragraph on page nine: 
II. 
As to scope of relief, I now think that we were 
overly concerned with the problem of damages. It 
seems to me that the opinion does enough by leaving 
open the question"whether respondents have other 
defenses, constitutional or otherwise". See pages 
sixteen and sev.enteen. 
If we wrote a separate opinion, we might state 
that the public printer has a"qualified immunity" 
-3-
under which he is liable in damages only where 
a private person can show malice. This cannot, 
however, be incorporated consistently in White 0 s 
draft since, if there is no privilege at all 
under any circumstances, there can hardly be 
a qualified privilege here. 
III. 
Finally, we were bothered by the invitation 
(on page fifteen) to Congress to confer statutory 
immunity on the Public Printer. I think that 
the conferring of such immunity might well raise 
serious constitutional problem• s. Does Congress, 
for example, have the co• nstitutional authority 
to confer immunity on its Sergeant-At-Arms and 
thereby avoid Tennely v. Brandhove. Iii Congress 
does have such authority, it presumably 
can make its acts unreviewable by immunizing all 
those who carry them out. I would recommend that 
you ask Justice White to delete all of the 
first full paragraph on page fifteen up to but not including 
the last four words on page fifteren-- "We conclude 
that, for". 
,ju:pnm:t (!Jou:rt of tqt 'J!lnitt~ j;tattg 
~attfri:nghm.1fl. (!f. 2Ll~~.;t 
CHAMBERS 01" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
Re: No. 71-6356 - Doe v. McMillan 
Dear Bill: 
March 7, 1973 
I cannot join the proposed opinion in this case 
and will await your dissent with interest. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to th~ Conference 
_ _ ,__,_ . ..,.,.......,......,........_.,_ , ---------,,.,._.-,. ,,...,.,.._._~----~---~......,...---........ -:r--....,__,.,.. 
.. -
March 10, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6356 Doe v. McMillan 
Dear Byroo: 
I have recently bad an opportunity to get tack into the perplexities 
of Doe v. MeMUlan, and have reread the clrculaticns. Although I stW 
ftnatiie area a real jlDlgle, and cmtfnue to have doulis about any formula-
tion of governing principles that I have yet seen or can myself devise, I 
am now prepared to join your opfnlon for the Court. 
I do have a feeU.ng that your draft may shut the door a bit too 
tightly on the distribution of material for the purpose of "informing the 
publJc coocemlng matters pending before Congress." On page 7, you say: 
wrhe prq>er scope of our inquiry, therefore, 1s whether 
public distributioos ot alleged actiooable material are 
legislative acts protected by the Speech or DebUe Clause 
when the distributions are authorized by the Congress. " 
I assume that some duly authorized publlc distributioo.s may well 
be protected tn ctreumstances where there are ratimal reascos for the 
public to be informed apeetfteally and directly by the Ccmgress. The text 
of your opinion recognizes this. I wander, therefore, whether you might 
think it apprqn1ate to express the "scope of our inquiry" in somewhat 
more limited terms, for example: 
''The proper seq>e of our inquiry, therefore, is whether 
the Speech or Debate Clause affords absolute imm\Dlity 
from private suit to perscos who, wtth authorizatioo from 
Congress, distribute materials whieh alle~ly infringe 
upon the rights of individuals. " 
-
This places the focus of inquiry on the immunity from ertvate 
suit rather than whether the distribution is a legislative act. 
I attach a copy of page 9 of ywr second draft opinion on which 
I have noted a couple of suggested, minor changes. You may also wish 
to cooslder the possibility of adding a note m that }:age (keyed to the 
sentence in the middle of the paragraph ending with the words "applicable 
laws", reading substantially as follows: 
''We have no occasion in this ease to decide whether or under 
what circumstances, the Speech or Debate Clause woold afford 
immunity to distributors of allegedly aett<mable materials 
from grand jury questic:ming. crbnJnal charges, or a suU by 
the executive to restrain dlstributic:m, where Cc:mgress bas 
authorized the particular public distributioo.. " 
Although I do net Imow the answer (which could tum m the facts of a 
particular ease), there may be a significant difference between the right 
of private citizens to sue as compared wUh the right of the Executive 
Branch to attack some dlstrtbUtlcm which it disapproved. As you point 
out, the historic purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to ''prevent 
intimidation of legislators by the Executive and aceoontabllity before a 
possible hostile Judiciary." A private suU for damages or even to 
restrain further publication of an unnecessary private libel does not 
threaten the independence of the Legislative Branch. 
I have been concerned also as to where your opinion leaves the 
Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents in terms of pers<mal 
liabUtty for doing what they are ordered to do. As a practical matter, 
they wm rarely - if ever - be in a posltlm to exercise an independent 
judgment as to whether some libelous or <therwise acttooable material 
1s tucked away in some document wh.ieh they are directed to print and 
distribute by the Congress or me of Us Committees. It seems unfair 
to put the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents in a more 
vulnerable posltim than that of their ''bosses". You do suggest .. by 
implJcatlon- that the Congress might cooter statutory immunity em 
these parties, but this procedure might enable Congress ... if it has the 
eODStltutlonal authority to do so - to make all of its acts and distributions 
tmreViewable by the simple device of immunizing all persoos who carry 





perhaps all we can do is write narrowly and await future eases. The 
important point in this ease is to record the Court's cmvietion that 
there 1s a point beyond which the reputations of private citizens cannot 
be smeared with impunity by wide publtc distribution merely because 
some congressional committee decides it wishes to "inform the pubHe". 
I hope these suggestioos may have some merit. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
be: Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr. 
f I 
f ' ")! 
Dear Byron: 
'::~·'' . " ,, . ' ,, ; . ' ., ' 
•.. ffi I have recently had 'an opportunity to get back into the perplexitie~, 
.,) of Doe v. MeMUJan, and have reread the etrculations. Although I still ·· ·'' 
"flnathe area a i'eil jungle, and cootJnue to have dout:ta about any formula- ,, 
tlon of goYerntng principles that I have yet seen or can myself devise, 1 
am now prepared to join your opinion for the Court. 
"' ~J\· ,)'~ 
I do have a feeling that your draft may shut the door a bit too · 
tightly on the distribatim of material for the purpose of "informing tbe 
publfe cmcerning matters peadlng before Cangress. " On page '1, you say: 
"11le proper scope of our inquiry, therefore, ia whether 
public distributions of alleged acttcmable material are 
legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause · 
when the distrlbutic;ms are authorized by the Con~ess. " 
''l',<J:' r( . ft 
I assume that some duly authorized public distrlbutlGIUI may well 
be protected In ctrcumatancea where there are ratlcmal reasc;ms for the 
· public to be Informed specifically and directly by the Ccm.greu. Tbe tea 
of your opinion recognizes this. I wooder, therefore, whether you migbt 
think tt appropriate to express the "SCoPe of our Inquiry" In somewhat 
more limited terms, for example: 
"'Ibe proper scope of our inquiry, therefore, 1a whether 
the Speech or Debate Clause affords absolute immunity 
from private sutt to persc:ms who, with authorlzattm from 
Congress, dtatrlbate materials which allegedly Infringe 
upon the rights of Individuals. " 
I" ' 
.: This places the focus of Inquiry on the tmmuntty from ertvate ' ' 
ntt rather than whether the dtstrtbutlon is a legtslatiye aet. '". ,., 
l: ,, 
I attaeh a eopy of page 9 of your seeood draft optnion on which ,, , 
' I have noted a couple of suggested, minor changes. You may also wish' 
to cc:mslder the possibility of adding a note em that page (keyed to the 
, sentence in the middle of the paragraph ending wJth the words "applicable 
Jaws", reading substantially as follows: ,,. 
1\i' I. 1, 
"~we have no occasion In this case to ~ide whether or under 
.what circumstances, the Speech or Debate Clause would afford 
,, •lmm1Dllty to distributors of allegedly actlaaable materials 
'from grand jury questioning, crlmiDal charges, or a su1t by ' 
the executive to restrain dlstrlbutlcm, where Coogress.bas 
authorized the particular public distribution. " , . · ;
1
' , 
~ , •: I t:'· 
" ''<I Although t""do not khow the answer (whleh Bcould tum 'm the facts of a ~ jl ' 
.. , particular ease), there may be a stgnUicant difference between the right ':"' 
of private cUlzens to sue as compared with the right of the Executive 'w 
Branch to attack some dlstribution which it disapproved. As you point . 
out, the historic purpose of the Speech or Delate Clause 18 to "prevent 
' , lnttmtdatton of legislators by the Executive and accatmtabllity before a ' I' 
· .. ~ possible hostile Judiciary." A private suit for damages or even to ·" 
restrain further publication of an unnecessary private ltbel does n~ · 
1 
·'JJ •• ,threaten the Jnd~pendence o~ ~Jle . Leglslative Branch. l~ . , ·~ .. 
• . _ - '.,~ ; ~( "-~ :S '' - ' ":p. 
-'~,k 'll ,. \1 AP.'~ ..... "1;- -, : -~ ' j~ 
'.',fhave been coneemed also as to where your 'optnioo leaves the · ~· 
Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents. in terms of pers<Xll.l 
lJabWty for doing what they are ordered to do. .As a practical matter, 
they wUl rarely - 1f eYer - be 1n a posltlcm to exercise an independent 
judgment as to whether some libelous or dberwtse acttooable material 
ts tucked away 1n some document which they are directed to prmt and 
distribute by the Congress or cme of its Committees • . It seems unfair 
to pat the Publle Printer and the Superintendent of Documents 1n a more 
• ~Y 't'Ulnerable position than that of their "bosses". ,You do suggest -by " • 
implleatton ,._ that the Congress might ccmfer statutory lmmUDity m , 
these parties, but thia procedure migbt enable Ccmgress - if it bas the ·· 
constitutional authority to do so - to make .all of its acts and dtstributloDS 
' "' unreriewable by the simple deYiee of lmmurlizlng all perscms who carry 
, them out • .. ,I . d«;) not lmow the answers to this dilemma, and ·~· 





~~/ perhaps all we can do is write narrowly and awalt future cases. The 
·;~"' important point in tbla cue 1s to record the Court's emvletioo that 
.,i , there 18 a point beyond which the reputations of private citizens cannot 
' :, , ' be smeared with impunity by wide public distribution merely because 
·· ·· ;; ·some congressional committee decides it wishes to "Inform the public 
~ ~ . 'ii\Jl!M ~·, ~~i~\r~~i,i r_1, tkJ~--t: ,l;i ~. l · ''" .. ib~ 
;'J hope :these suggestions ~y hay:e some merit. 
~ 
..:;. 
t . ·t\ 
' 'e~r.\>'i,,·, 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~n.pmm ~o.ttrt cf t4t ~ti:tth .§ta±ts 
'Jlnsfrittghttt. ;m. ~· 20.3J~~ 
March 13, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6356 -Doe v. McMillan 
Dear Lewis: 
/ 
I shall be happy to make the changes you suggest in 
the circulating draft opinion in this case. 
I see no acceptable way at this time to distinguish 
between conduct the Speech or Debate Clause protects from 
private suit and that which it protects from criminal 
prosecution or other action. In either event, if the con-
duct is legislative it seems to me that it is immune. 
Legislators are protected from suit or liability for 
libeling a person on the floor or in committee, for having 
the libel printed for legislative use and also for voting 
to have it publicly distributed. But the cases, see for 
example Kilbourn, distinguish between the legislative 
ordering and the doing of the ordered or authorized act 
that is otherwise vulnerable under the law. The Clause does 
not protect legislators who themselves participate in 
ordinary criminal acts. Nor should it, in my view, protect 
those who publicly distribute libels beyond the environs of 
the legislative process. 
It seems to me that there is constitutional basis 
for immunity for the Congressional Record and a constitu-
tional and case-law basis for immunizing congressmen and 
their staffs when they make public records at committee 
hearings and when they later write and circulate committee 
reports as in this case. Also, at each of these steps, the 
press under prevailing law, has a qualified privilege to 
report. I thus see no lack of opportunity for the interested 
public to inform itself. 
Then why worry about 11further 11 public distribution? 
Hasn't the good or evil been accomplished and why is not 
-2-
further publication as immune as the first disclosure in 
committee or on the floor? If it is, of course, we should 
be on the other side in this case. But libel and privacy 
law has been more discriminating than that and has been 
able to distinguish the privileged from the later unprivi-
leged publication -- all with an eye to preventing 
gratuitous injury with no countervailing return. That a 
first publication is privileged or has been sued on and 
paid for does not excuse a later one, whether by the same 
or a different publisher. 
It may be, as you intimate and as I indicated in an 
earlier memo, that we are actually accomplishing little in 
this decision. But I suppose it is not wholly an advisory 
opinion. 
I do appreciate your thoughts. 
Sincerely, 
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John L. McMillan 
) 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of 
et al. Columbia Circuit. 
[February - , 1973] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opuuon of the 
Court. 
This case concerns the scope of congressional immunity 
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, as well as the reach of 
official immunity, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(1959) , particularly in the legislative context, see Tenney 
v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). 
By resolution adopted February 5, 1969, H. R. Rep. No. 
76, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong Rec. 2784, the House 
of Representatives authorized the Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia or its subcommittee "to conduct a full 
and complete investigation and study of . . _ the organi-
zation, management, operation, and administration" of 
any department or agency of the government of the 
District of Columbia or of any independent agency or 
instrumentality of government operating solely in the 
District of Columbia. The committee was given sub-
poena power and was directed to "report to the House 
as soon as practicable .. . the results of its investiga-
tion and study together with such recommendations as 
it deems advisable.'' On December 8, 1970, a Special 
Select Subcommittee of the Committee on the District 
Qf Columbia submitted to the Speaker of the House a. 
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report, H. R. Rep. No. 91-1681, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess .. 
(1970), represented to be a summary of the Subcom"' 
mittee's investigation and hearings devoted to the pub-
lic school system of the District of Columbia. On the 
same day, the report was referred to the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union and was 
ordered printed. 116 Cong. Rec. H 11347. Thereafter, 
the report was printed and distributed by the Govern-
ment Printing Office pursuallt to 44 U. S. C. ~§ 501 and 
701. 
The 450-page report included among its supporting 
<;lata some 45 pages that are the gravamen of petitioners' 
suit. Included in the pertinent pages were copies of 
absence sheets, lists of absentees, copies of test papers, 
and documents relating to disciplinary problems of cer-
tain specifically-named students. 1 The report stated 
that these materials were included to "give a realistic 
view" of a troubled school and "the lack of administra-
tive efforts to rectify the multitudinous problems there," 
to show the level of reading ability of seventh graders 
who were given a fifth-grade history test, and to illus-
trate suspension and disciplinary problems." 
On January 8, 1971, petitioners, under pseudonyms, 
brought an action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia on behalf of themselves, their 
children, and all other children and parents similarly 
situated. The named defendants were ( 1) the Chair-
1 The Court of Appeals' opimou terms the matenal~ "somewhat 
(ierogatory." The absentee lio;ts named stud0nts who W<'l'<' frrqu<'nt 
"class eutt0rs." Of the 29 teo;t paper::; publishrd in the r<:>port, 21 
bore failing gradr~; all includrd th<:> namr of th<:> student being trHt<:>d. 
Th<:> l<:>tters, m0moranda, and othrr documrnto; r<:>lating to disciplinary 
problems drtailed conduct of sprrifically named students. Som<' of 
the deviant conduct cl<:>scrib0d mvolved srxual prrversion and cnm-
mal violat10ns. 
2 Th<:> informat10n was obtamrcl voluntarily from Distnct of Co-
lumbia school personnel by Committe<:> mvcstigators 
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man and Members of the House Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia; (2) the Clerk, Staff Director, and 
Counsel of the Committee; (3) a consultant and an in-
vestigator for the Committee; ( 4) the Superintendent 
of Documents and the Public Printer; ( 5) the Presi-
dent and members of the Board of Education of the 
District of Columbia; (6) the Superintendent of Public 
Schools of the District of Columbia; ( 7) the principal of 
Jefferson High School and one of the teachers at that 
school; and (8) the United States of America. 
Petitioners alleged that, by disclosing, disseminating, 
and publishing the information contained in the report, 
the defendants had violated the petitioners' and their 
children's statutory, constitutional, and common law 
rights to privacy and that such publication had caused 
and would cause grave damage to the children's mental 
and physical health and to their reputations, good names, 
and future careers. Petitioners also alleged various vio-
lations of local law. Petitioners further charged that 
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute 
and publish information concerning plaintiffs, their 
children and other students." The complaint prayed for 
.an order enjoining the defendants from further publica-
tion, disseminatiou, and distribution of any report con-
taining the objectionable material and for an order re-
calling the reports to the extent practicable, and deleting 
the objectionable material from the report already in 
circulation. Petitioners also asked for compensatory and 
punitive damages. 3 
The District Court, after a hearing on motions for> 
a temporary restraining order and for an order against 
~ The prayer also Jncludeu a reque:;t for an in.]unrtwn prohibiting-
future disclmmre of ' 'confidential information" and requiring the Dis-
trict of Columbia School Board "to establish rule:; and regulation!$ 
regarding the confidentiality of school paprr::; and the right of priYacy 
of stndents in tbr schools of the District of Columbia,. 
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further distribution of the report, dismissed the action-
against the individual defendants on the ground that · 
the conduct complain'ed of was absolutely privileged." 
A divided pa1iel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Without 
determining whether the complaint stated a cause of 
action under the Constitution or any applicable law, the· 
majority held that the Members of Congress, the Com-
mittee staff employees, and the Public Printer and Super-
intendent of Documents ·were immune from the liability 
asserted against them because of the Speech and Debate 
Clause and that the official immunity doctrine recognized 
in Barr v. Matteo barred any liability on the part of the 
District of ,Columbia officials as well as the legislative· 
employees.5 We granted certiorari, 408 U. S. 922. 
I 
To "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Execu-
tive and accountability before a possible hostile judici-
ary,'' Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 617 (1972), 
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides that "for 
any Speech or Debate .in either House, they [Members 
of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place." 
"The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to as-
sume a co-equal branch of the government-wide 
freedom of speech, debate. and deliberation without 
.t The Dititrict Court also di~mi~sed the tiLllt agamst the United 
Stateti for failure to exhaust adminitltrative remedie~. 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2675 (a) . That ruling is not challenged here. 
5 The Court of Appeals also independently found that mJunctJve 
relief would not istlue because of ati~urancrs from the federal defend-
antti that no republication or further distribution of the Heport was 
cont!'mplated. "'itl,l resJ>eci, to petitioners' requ('st for injunctive 
relid against the District of Columbia officials, the Court found that , 
because of the adoptwn of new polici('s concerning confidential infor-
matiOn, "there i,~ no t-;ub:-;tantml threat of future injury to appellantH.'1 
/l-6656-0PINlON 
DOE v . McMILLAN 
intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. 
It thus protects Members against prosecutions that 
directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative 
process." Gravel v. United States, supra, at 616. 
The Speech and Debate Clause has been read "broadly 
to effectuate its purposes," United States v. Johnson, 
383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966); Gravel v. United States, supra, 
at 624, and includes within its protections anything 
"generally done in a session of the House by one of its 
members in relation to the business before it." Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 204 (1880); United States 
v. Johnson, supra, at 179; Gravel v. United States, supra, 
a.t 624. Thus "voting by Members and committee re-
ports are protected" and "a Member's conduct at legisla-
tive committee hearings, although subject to judicial 
review in various circumstances, as is legislation itself, 
may not be made the basis for a civil or criminal judg-
J1lent against a Member because that conduct is within 
the 1Sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' " Ibid. 
Without belaboring the matter further, it is plain to , 
us that the complaint in this case was barred by the 
Speech or Debate Clause insofar as it sought relief from 
the Congressmen-committee members, from the commit-
tee staff, from the consultant, or from the investigator, 
for introducing material at committee hearings that 
identified particular individuals, for referring the Report 
that included the material to the Speaker of the House, 
~nd for voting for publication of the report. Doubtless, 
also, a published report may, without losing Speech and 
Debate Clause protection, be distributed to and used 
fpr legislative purposes by Members of Congress, con-
gressional committees, and institutional or individual 
legislative functionaries. At least in these respects, the 
actions upon which petitioners sought to predicate lia-
7 J-6;~50--0PINION 
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bility were "legislative acts," Gravel v. United States, 
supra, at 618, and, as such, were immune from suit." 
Petitioners argue that including in the record of the 
hearings and in the Report itself materials describing 
particular conduct on the part of identified children was 
actionable because unnecessary and irrelevant to any 
legislative purpose. Cases in this Court, however, from 
Kilbourn to Gravel pretermit the imposition of liability 
on any such theory. Congressmen and their aides are 
immune from liability for their actions within the "legis-
lative sphere," id., at 624-625, even though their con-
0 uct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, 
would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary 
to criminal or civil statutes. Although we might disagree 
with the Committee as to whether it was necessary or 
even remotely useful to include the names of individual 
children in the evidence submitted to the Committee and 
in the Committee Report, we have no authority to 
oversee the judgment of the Committee in this respect 
or to impose liability on them if we disagree with their 
legislative judgment. The acts of authorizing an investi-
gation pursuant to which the subject materials were 
gathered, the acts of holding hearings where the ma-
terials were presented, preparing a Report where they 
were reproduced, and authorizing the publication and 
distribution of that Report where "all integral part[s] 
of the deliberative and communicative processes by which 
Members participate in committee and House proceed-
mgs with respect to the consideration and passage or 
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other 
matters which the Constitution places within the juris-
11 In Gravel, we held that ''the Srwech and Drbate Clau~r apjlllrH 
not only to a Member but alo:o to hi:s aidrs insofar as the conduct 
of the Jattrr would bP a protrcted lPgislativr act if prrformrd by 
thr MPmlwr himsrlf" Gravel v United States. 401\ P. S., at (il~ . 
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diction of either House.'' !d., at 625. As such, the acts· 
were protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. 
Our cases make perfectly apparent, however, that 
everything a Member of Congress may regularly do is 
not a legislative act within the protection of the Speech 
or Debate Clause. "fT] he Clause has not been ex-
tended beyond the legislative sphere," and "[l] egislative 
acts are not all-encompassing." Id., at 624-625. Mem-
bers of Congress may frequently be in touch with and 
seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government, 
but this conduct "though generally done, is not pro-
tected legislative activity." I d., at 625; United States v. 
Johnson, supra: Nor does the Speech and Debate Clause 
protect a private republication of documents introduced 
and made public at a committee hearing, although the 
hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative proc-
ess. Gravel V. United States, supra. 
The proper scope of our inquiry, therefore. is whether 
the Speech and Debate Clause affords absolute immunity 
from private suit to persons who, with authorization from 
Congress, distribute materials which allegedly infringe 
upon the rights of individuals. The respondent insists 
that such public distributions are protected. that the 
Clause immunizes not only publication for the informa-
tion and use of Members in the performance of their 
legislative duties but also must be held to protect "pub-
lications to the public through the facilities of Con-
gress." Public dissemination, it is argued, will serve "the 
important legislative function of informing the public 
concerning matters pending before Congress . ... 
Brief for Legislative Respondents, p. 27. 
We do not doubt the importance of informing the 
public about the business of Congress. However, the-
question remains whether the act of doing so, simply 
because authorized by Congress, must always be con-
sidered "an integral part of the deliberative and com-
71-6356-0PINION 
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municative processes by which Members partici1)ate in 
committee and House proceedings'' with respect to legis-
lative or other matters before the House. Gravel v. 
United States, supra/ at 625. A Member of Congress 
may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's 
stand in his home district, and clearly the Speech and 
Debate Clause would not protect such an act even though 
the libel was read from an official committee report! 
The reason is that republishing a libel under such cir-
cumstances is not an essential part of the legislative proc-
ess and is not part of that deliberative process "by which 
members participate in committee and House proceed-
ings.'' Ibid. By the same token, others, such as the 
Superintendent of Documents or the Public Printer or 
legislative personnel, who participate in distributions of 
actionable material beyond the reasonable bounds of the 
legislative task, enjoy no Speech and Debate Clause 
immunity. 
Members of Congress are themselves immune for order-
ing or voting for a publication going beyond the reason-
able requirements of the legislative function, Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, supra, but the Speech and Debate Clause 
no more insulates legislative functionaries carrying out 
such nonlegislati ve directives than it protected the ser-
geant-at-arms in Kilbourn v. Thompson when, at the 
direction of the House, he made an arrest that the courts 
subsequently found to be "without authority.' ' ld., at 
200. The Clause does not protect "criminal conduct 
threatening the security of the person or property of 
others, whether performed at the direction of the Senator 
in preparation for or in execution of a legislative act or 
7 The rcpublicalio11 of It libel, in circum~tances where t be 111Jt!Hl 
publication is privilegeq, is generally unprotected. See generally 
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 5.18 (1956); Pro~ser , Torti-;, 
765-769 (4th ed. 1971) . Set> abo Gravel v. United States, 40R U.S.,. 
nt 622-627. 
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done without his knowledge or direction." Gravel v. 
United States, supra, at 622. Neither, we think, docs it 
immunize those who publish and distribute otherwise 
actionable materials beyond the reasonable requirements 
of the legislative function. 
Thus we cannot accept the proposition that in order 
to perform its legislative function Congress not only must 
at times consider and use actionable material but also 
must be free to disseminate it to the public at large, no 
matter how injurious to private reputation that ma-
terial might be. We cannot believe that the purpose of 
the Clause-"to prevent intimidation of legislators by 
the Executive and accountability before a possibly hos-
tile judiciary,'' id., at 617- will suffer in the slightest if 
it is held that those who, at the direction of Congress 
or otherwise, distribute actionable material to the pub-
lic at large have no automatic immunity under the 
Speech and Debate Clause but must respond to private 
suits to the extent that others must respond in light of 
the Constitution and applicable laws.' To hold other-
wise would be to invite gratuitous injury to citizens for 
little if any public purpose. We are unwilling to sanc-
tion such a result, at least absent more compelling evi-
dence that, in order to perform its legislative function, 
Congress must not only inform the public about the 
fundamentals of its business but also must distribute } 
to the public generally materials otherwise actionable 
under local law. 
That the Speech and Debate Clause has finite limits is 
important for present purposes. The complaint before 
" Wr havE' no ocem;ion in thi~ caHP to drcidc whrthrr or undrr what 
circumstarrces, tlw SpE'r:>ch or Dehate Clam;r would afford immumty 
to d1~tributor~ of aflegrdl~' actionable material~ from grand jury 
qurstioning, criminal charges, or a ::mit by the E'xrcutivc to re::;train 
~Tistribut ion, whNP Congrr,.:~ ha" a uthonzrd t lw part irular puhlir 
di~tribut 1011. 
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us alleges that the respondents caused the committee 
report "to be distributed to the public," that "distribu-
tion of the report continues to the present," and that 
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute 
and publish" damaging information about petitioners and 
their children. It does not expressly appear from the 
complaint, nor is it contended in this Court, that either 
the Members of Congress or the Committee personnel did 
anything more than conduct the hearings, prepare the 
Report, and authorize its publication. As we have stated, 
such acts by those respondents are protected by the 
Speech and Debate Clause and may not serve as a 
predicate for a suit. The complaint was therefore 
properly dismissed as to these respondents. Other re-
spondents, however, are alleged to have carried out a 
public distribution and to be ready to continue such 
dissemination. 
In response to these latter allegations, the Court of Ap-
peals, after receiving sufficient assurances from the re-
spondents that they had no intention of seeking a repub-
lication or carrying out further distribution of the report, 
concluded that there was no basis for injunctive relief. 
But this left the question whether any part of the previ-
ous publication and public distribution by respondents 
other than the Members of Congress and Committee per-
sonnel went beyond the limits of the legislative immunity 
provided by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Con-
~titution. Until that question was resolved, the com-
plaint should not have been dismissed on threshold im-
munity grounds, unless the Court of Appeals was correct 
in ruling that the action against the other respondents 
was foreclosed by t~e doctrine of official immunity, a 
question to which we now turn . 
If 
The official immunity doctrine, which "has in large 
part been of judicial making," Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 
l 1 
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564, 569 (1959), confers immunity on government offi~ 
cials of suitable rank for the reason that "officials of 
government should be free to exercise their duties unem~ 
barrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts 
done in the course of those duties-suits which would 
consume time and energies which would otherwise be 
devoted to governmental service and the threat of which 
might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effec-
tive administration of policies of Government." I d., at 
57l.u The official immunity doctrine seeks to reconcile 
two important considerations-
" [ 0] n the one hand, the protection of the individual 
citizens against pecuniary damage caused by oppres-
sive or malicious action on the part of officials of 
the Federal Government; and on the other, the pro-
tection of the public interest by shielding responsible 
governmental officers against the harassment and 
inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded dam-
age suits brought on account of action taken in the 
exercise of their official responsibilities." I d. , at 565. 
In the Barr case, the Court reaffirmed existing immu-
nity law but made it clear that the immunity conferred 
might not be the same for all officials for all purposes. 
!d., at 573; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 
378; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 ( 1967). 
Judges, like executive officers with discretionary func-
tions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of 
their motive or good faith. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 
569; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 553-555 ( 1967). But 
policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more 
limited privilege. !d., at 555-558. Also, the Court de-
termined in Barr that the scope of immunity from 
H Both brfore and aftrr Barr, official munumty ha ::; been hrld ap-
plicable to officials of the Legislative Branch . See Tenney v. Brand-
hove, :341 U. S. 367 (1951) ; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 
(1967) . 
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defamation suits should be determined by the relation 
of the publication complained of to the duties entrustecL 
to the officer. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 573-574; see also 
the companion case, H award v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 5931 
597-598 (1959). The scope of immunity has always 
been tied to the "scope of authority." Wheeldin v. 
Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963). In the legislative 
context, for instance, " [ t] his Court has not hesitated 
to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found 
Congress was acting outside its legislative role." Ten-
ney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377. Thus, we have recog-
nil!led "the immunity of legislators for acts within the 
legislative role," Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554 (1967), 
but have carefully confined that immunity to protect 
only acts within "the sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 376. 
Because the Court has not fashioned a fixed, invariable 
rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry 
into whether the contributions of immunity to effective 
government in particular contexts outweighs the perhaps 
recurring harm to individual citizens, there is no ready-
made answer as to whether the remaining federal re-
spondents-the Public Printer and the Superintendent of 
Documents-should be accorded absolute immunity in 
this case. Of course, to the extent that they serve legis-
lative functions the performance of which would be im-
mune conduct if done by congressmen, these officials 
enjoy the protection of the Speech and Debate Clause. 
Our inquiry here, however, is whether, if they participate 
in publication and distribution beyond the legislative 
sphere, and thus beyond the protection of the Speech and 
Debate Clause, they are nevertheless protected by the 
doctrine of official immunity. Our starting point is at 
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The statutes of the United States create the office of 
Public Printer to manage and supervise the Government 
Printing Office, which, with certain exceptions, is the au-
thorized printer for the various branches of the Federal 
Government. 44 U. S. C. § 301. "Printing and bind~ 
l.ng may be done at the Government Printing Office only 
when authorized by law." § 501. The Public Printer 
is authorized to do printing for Congress, §§ 701-741, 
901-910, as well as for the Executive and Judicial 
Branches of Government, §§ 1101-1123. The Public 
Printer is authorized to appoint the Superintendent of 
Documents with duties concerning the distribution and 
sale of documents. §§ 1701-1722. 
Under the applicable statutes, when either House of 
Congress orders a document printed, the Printer is to 
print the "usual number" unless a greater number is 
ordered. § 701. The "usual number" is 1,682, to be 
divided between bound and unbound copies and dis-
tributed to named officers or offices of the House and 
Senate, to the Library of Congress, and to the Superin-
tendent of Documents for further distribution "to the 
State libraries and designated depositories." !bid."' 
There are also statutory provisions for the printing of 
extra copies, § 702, bills and resolutions, § 706-708, public 
and private laws, postal conventions, and treaties, §§ 709-
712, journals, § 713, the Congressional Directory, § 721-
722, memorial addresses, § 723-724, the Statutes at Large, 
§ 728-729. Section 733 provides that " [ t] he Public 
Printer on order of a Member of Congress, on prepay-
ment of costs, may reprint documents and reports of 
'"For the authorization lo ~upply sufficient copies for ~uch distri-
bution see § 738. The Public Printer is al~o required to furnish the 
Department of State with 20 copies of all congressional documents. 
and report~ . 44 U. S. C. § 715 
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committees together with the evidence papers submitted~, 
or any part ordered printed by the Congress." 
With respect to printing for the Executive and Judicial 
Branches. it is provided that "a head of an executive 
department ... may not cause to be printed, and the 
Public Printer may not print, a document or matter 
unless it is authorized by law and necessary to the public 
business." § 1102 (a). The executive departments and 
the courts are to requisition printing by certifying that 
it is "necessary for the public service." § 1103. 
The Superintendent of Documents has charge of the 
distribution of all public documents except those printed 
for use of the executive departments, "which shall be 
delivered to the departments," and for either House of 
Congress, "which shall be delivered to the Senate Service 
Department and House of Representatives Publications 
Distribution Service.'' § 1702. He is thus in charge of 
the public sale and distribution of documents. The Pub-
lic Printer is instructed to "print additional copies of a 
Government publication, not confidential in character, 
required for sale to the public by the Superintendent of 
Documents," subject to regulation by the Joint Commit-
tee on Printing. § 1705. 
It is apparent that under th1s statutory framework, 
the printing of documents and their general distribution 
to the public would be "within the outer perimeter" of 
the statutory duties of the Public Printer and the Super-
intendent of Documents. Barr v. Mateo, supra, at 575. 
·Thus, if official immunity automatically attaches to any 
conduct expressly or impliedly authorized by law. the 
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint 
against these officials. This, however. is not the govern-
ing rule. 
The duties of the Public Printer and his appomtee, the 
Superintendent of Documents, are to print, handle, dis-
tribute, and sell government documents. The Govern-
t l 
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tnent Printing Office acts as a service organization for 
the branches of the Government. What it prints is pro-
duced elsewhere and is printed and distributed at the 
direction of the Congress, the departments, the independ-
ent agencies and offices, or the Judicial Branch of the 
Government. The Public Printer and Superintendent 
of Documents exercise discretion only with respect to 
estimating the demand for particular documents and ad-
justing the supply accordingly. The existence of a Pub-
lic Printer makes it unnecessary for every government 
agency and office to have a printer of its own. The Print-
ing Office is independently created and manned and 
imbued with its own statutory duties; but, we do not 
think that its independent establishment carries with it 
an independent immunity. Rather, the Printing Office 
is immune from suit when it prints for an executive de-
partment for example, only to the extent that it would 
be if it were part of the department itself or, in other 
words, to the extent that the department head himself 
would be immune if he ran his own printing press and 
distributed his own documents. To hold otherwise would 
mean that an executive department could acquire im-
munity for non-immune materials merely by presenting 
the proper certificate to the Public Printer, who would 
then have the duty to print the material. Under such a 
holding, the department would have a seemingly fool-
proof method for manufacturing immunity for materials 
which the court would not otherwise hold immune if not 
sufficiently connected with the "official duties" of the 
department. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S., at § 597. 
Congress has conferred no express, statutory immunity 
on the Public Printer or the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. Congress has not provided that these officials 
should be immune for printing and distributing materials 
where those who author the materials would not be. 
We thus face no statutory or constitutional problems in 
71-(1;~56--0PINlON 
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interpretmg this doctrine of "judicial making." Barr v, 
Matteo, 360 U. S., at 569. We do, however, write in the 
shadow of Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408· 
U. S. 564 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400' 
U. S. 433 (1971), where the Court advised caution 
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him . .. . " !d., at 437. We conclude that, for 
the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of im-
munity, the Printer and the Superintendent of Docu-
ments are no more free from suit in the case before us 
than would be a legislative aide who made copies of the 
materials at issue and distributed them to the public at 
the direction of his superiors. See Dombrowski v. East-
land, 387 U. S. 82 ( 1967). The scope of inquiry becomes 
equivalent to the inquiry in the context of the Speech 
and Debate Clause, and the answer is the same. The 
·business of Congress is to legislate; congressmen and 
aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating. 
But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate 
legislative activity, " Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 
376. they enjoy no special immunity from local laws pro-
tecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary 
citizen . 
Because we think the Court of Appeals applied the 
immunities of the Speech and Debate Clause and of the 
doctrine of official immunity too broadly, we must vacate 
its judgment and remand the case for appropriate fur-
ther proceedings." We are unaware, from this record, 
of the extent of the publication and distribution of the-
11 With ff'l:>JWct to the District of Columbm rcsponcle11ts, the Court 
of Appeals found that they were act ing within the scope of their 
authority undPr applicable law and, as a rrsult, wcrP JmmuJJC from 
.:mit. We do not disl nrb thP judgment of thP Court of ApJwalH Ill" 
t h u:; fPSJWCt . 
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Report which has taken place to elate. Thus we have 
little basis for judging whether the legitimate legislative 
needs of Congress, and hence the limits of immunity, 
have been exceeded. These matters are for the lower 
courts in the first instance. 
Of course, like the Court of Appeals, we indicate noth-
ing as to whether petitioners have pleaded a good cause 
of action or whether respondents have other defenses, 
constitutional or otherwise. We have dealt only with 
the threshold question of immunity.'" 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in 
part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to 
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion . 
So ordered. 
H We tim~ have 110 OC'CaHion to ron~idrr Art. r. § 5, cl. ;{ wluch 
rrquires that ''Each Hou~r Hhall. krep a Joumal of it~ .Procreding;;, 
and from time to time publiHh the Harne, excepting such Part;; as 
mar in their Judgment requirr SPcrecy ... " ; nor need we denl 
wtth publieatwn;; of the Judicial Branch and the legal lmmtllliti<'"-
that may be attached thereto 
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This case concerns the scope of congressional Immunity 
under the Speech or Debate Clause of the United 8tates 
Constitution, Art. I , § 6, cl. 1, as well as the reach of 
official immunity in the legislative context. See Barr v. 
Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959 ) : Tenney v. Brandhove,. 
341 U. S. 367 (1951) 
By resolution adopted February 5, 1969, H. Res. No. 
76, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong Rec. 2784, the House 
of Representatives authorized the Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia or its subcommittee "to conduct a full 
and complete investigation and study of . . . the organi-
zation, management, operation and administration" of 
any department or agency of the government of the 
District of Columbia or of any independent agency or 
instrumentality of government operating solely within 
the District of Columbia. The committee was given sub-
poena power and was directed to "report to the House 
as soon as practicable the results of its investiga-
tion and study together with such recommendations as 
it deems advisable." On December 8, 1970, a Special 
Select Subcommittee of the Committee on the District 
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report, H. R. Rep. No. 91-1681, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1970), represented to be a summary of the Subcom-
mittee's investigation and hearings devoted to the pub-
lic school system of the District of Columbia. On the 
same day, the report was referred to the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union and was 
ordered printed. 116 Cong. Rec. 40311 (1970). There-
after, the report was printed and distributed by the Gov-
ernment Printing Office pursuant to 44 l. S. C. §~ 501 
and 701. 
The 450-page report included among its supporting 
data some 45 pages that are the gravamen of petitioners' 
suit. Included in the pertinent pages were copies of 
absence sheets, lists of absentees, copies of test papers, 
and documents relating to disciplinary problems of cer-
tain specifically-named students.1 The report stated 
that these materials were included to "give a realistic 
view" of a troubled school and "the lack of administra-
tive efforts to rectify the multitudinous problems there," 
to show the level of reading ability of seventh graders 
who were given a fifth-grade history test, and to illus-
trate suspension and disciplinary problems.2 
On January 8, 1971, petitioners, under pseudonyms, 
brought an action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia on behalf of themselves, their 
children, and all other children and parents similarly 
situated. The named defendants were (1) the Chair-
1 The Court of Appeals ' opinion termR the materiab "somewhat 
derogatory ." The ab~entee lists namrd studrnt::; who were frequent 
"class cutter~." Of the 29 test paper:; publi;;hed in the report, 21 
bore failing grades ; all included the name of the ::;tudent being tested. 
The letters, memoranda, and other documents relating to disciplinary 
problems detailed conduct of specifically named ;;tudents. Some of 
the deviant conduct described mvolved sexual prrversion and crim-
inal violations. 
2 The information was obtamed voluntarily from District of Co-
Jumhia school personnel by Comm1ttee investigators 
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:man and members of the House Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia; (2) the Clerk, Staff Director, and 
Counsel of the Committee; (3) a consultant and an in-
vestigator for the Committee; ( 4) the Superintendent 
of Documents and the Public Printer; ( 5) the Presi-
dent and members of the Board of Education of the 
District of Columbia; (6) the Superintendent of Public 
Schools of the District of Columbia; ('7) the principal of 
Jefferson High School and one of the teachers at that 
school; and (8) the United States of America. 
Petition~rs alleged that, by disclosing, disseminating, 
and publishing the information contained in the ~eport, 
the defendants had violated the petitioners' and their 
children's statutory, constitutional. and common law 
rights to privacy and that such publication had caused 
and would cause grave damage to the children's mental 
and physical health and to their reputations, good names, 
and future careers. Petitioners also alleged various vio-
lations of local law. Petitioners further charged that 
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute 
and publish information concerning plaintiffs, their 
children and other students." The complaint prayed for 
an order enjoining the defendants from further publica-
tion, dissemination, and distribution of any report con-
taining the objectionable material and for an order re-
calling the reports to the extent practicable and deleting 
the objectionable material from the reports already in 
circulation. Petitioners also asked for compensatory and 
punitive damages.8 
The District Court, after a hearing on motions for 
a temporary restraining order and for an order against 
3 The prayer all:lo included a reque~t for an m]unchon prolubitmg 
future dil:lclosure of "confidential information" and requiring the Dis-
trict of Columbia School Board "to cstablil:lh rule~; and regulations 
regarding the confidentiality of school paper::; a))([ the right of privacy 
of studcntl:l in the schooll:l of the District of Columb41. " · 
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further distribution of the report, dismissed the action 
against the individual defendants on the ground that 
the conduct complained of was absolutely privileged! 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Without 
determining whether the complaint stated a cause of 
action under the Constitution or any applicable law, the 
majority held that the Members of Congress, the Com-
mittee staff employees, and the Public Printer and Super-
intendent of Documents were immune from the liability 
asserted against them because of the Speech or Debate 
Clause and that the official immunity doctrine recognized 
in Barr v. Matteo, supra, barred any liability on the part 
of the District of Columbia officials as well as the legis~ 
lative employees. ~ We granted certiorari, 408 U. S. 922. 
I 
To "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Execu-
tive and accountability before a possibly hostile judici-
ary," Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 617 ( 1972) , 
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides that "for 
any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Members 
of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place." 
"The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to as-
sume a co-equal branch of the governmentwide 
freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without 
4 The District Court also dismissed the suit against the United 
States for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 28 U S. C. 
§ 2675 (a). That ruling is not challenged here. 
5 The Court of Appeals also independently found that injunctive 
relief would not issue because of assurances from the federal defend-
ants that no republication or further distribution of the Report was 
contemplated. With respect to petitioners' request for injunctive 
relief against the District of Columbia officials, the Court found that, 
because of the adoption of new policies concerning confidential infor-
mation, "there is no substantial threat of future injury to appellants," 
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intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. 
It thus protects Members against prosecutions that 
directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative 
process." Gravel v. United SLates, supra, at 61()." 
The Speech or Debate Clause has been read "broadly 
to effectuate its purposes," United States v. Johnson, 
383 U. S. 169, 180 (1966); Gravel v. United States, supra, 
at 624, and includes within its protections anything 
"generally done in a session of the House by one of its 
members in relation to the businPss before it." Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 204 (1880); United States 
v. Johnson, supra, at 179; Gravel v. United States, supra, 
at 624; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 502 ( 19GD); 
United States v. Brewster, 40R P . S. 501. 5ml. 51:2- 513 
( 1972). 
"A legislative act has consistently been defined as 
an act generally done in Congress in relatiou to the 
business before it. . . . [ T Jhe Speech or Debat<' 
Clause prohibits inquiry only into those things gen-
erally said or done in the House or the S(•nate in the 
performance of official duties and into thP motiva-
tion for those acts." !d., at 51:2 . 
Thus "voting by Member::; and coimmtteC' r<'ports are 
protected" and "a Mcmbcr's conduct at legislative com-
mittee hearings. although sub,1ect to .JUdicial review 111 
various circumstances. as is legislation itself. may not bc 
made thc basis for a civil or criminal judgment agaimt 
a Member because that conduct is 1vithin the 'sphere 
<~"Our ><pePrh or drbnt<' privilege wa:> drHtgtwd to prC'~rrv<' legt~la­
tiV<' md<'JW11cl<'nrr , not ~upremac~·. Our ta:;k, tlwrdon•, t>< to nppl~· 
t lw Clau~e in "'uch a way as to insun• the mdepPndenre of t h(• lrgiH!a -
1urC' 1\'ithout altPring 1hr l11:>torir balanc<· of the thrPP <'o-l'qual 
branrh<'ti of Govrmmrnt.'' United Stc1tl's , . l3rew8ter. 40X ( ' ~ . 501 , 
.')Qf' (1972). 
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of legitimate legislative aetivity .·" Umvel v. ( ·111/ed 
States, supm, at 624. 
Without belaboring the matter fmther, it is plain to 
us that the complaint in this case was barred by the 
Speech or Debate Clause insofar as it sought relief from 
the Congressmen-Committe<' member!', from thr commit· 
tee staff, from the consultant, or from the investigator, 
for introducing material at committee hearings that 
identified particular individuals, for referring the Report 
that included the material to the Speaker of the House, 
and for voting for publication of the report. Doubtless, 
also. a published report may. without losing Spc<'ch or 
Debate Clause protection, be distributed to and used 
for legislative purposes by Members of Congress, con-
gressional committees, and institutional or individual 
legislative functionaries. At least in these respects, the 
actions upon which petitioners sought to predicate lia-
bility were "legislative acts," Gravel v. United States, 
supra, at 618. and. as such, wer<' immune from suit.1 
Petitioners argue that including in the record of the 
hearings and in the Report itself materials describing 
particular conduct on the part of identified children was 
actionable because unnecessary and irrelevant to any 
legislative purpose. Cases in this Court, however, from 
Kilbourn to Gravel pretermit the imposition of liability 
on any such theory. Congressmen and their aides are 
immune from liability for their actions within the "legis-
lative sphere.'' Gravel\' . United Slates, supra, at 624-625. 
even though their conduct, if performed in other than 
legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or 
otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutrs. Al-
though we might disagree with the Committee as to 
' ln Oravel. ,,.<' hC'ld that "tiH' 8pr<·<"h or Dr batr Cla u ~<· appii<·~ 
not onl~· to a Membrr but also to hi~ mdrs msofar as the conduct 
of the latter would be a protected legi~lat 1ve act if performed by 
the Member himself." Gravel v. United States , 408 U S., at 618. 
71-6356-0PINION 
DOE v. McMILLAN 
whether it was necessary, or even remotely useful. to 
include the names of individual children in the evidence 
submitted to the Committee and in the Committee 
Report, we have no authority to oversee the judgment 
of the Committee in this respect or to .impose liability 
on them if we disagree with their legislative judgment. 
The acts of authorizing · an investig~tiou pursuant to 
which the subject materials were g~thered. holding hear-
ings where the materials were presented. preparing a 
Report where they were reproduced, and authorizing the 
publication and distribution of that Report were all "in-
tegral part[s] of the deliberative and communicative 
processes by which Members participate in com1pittee 
and House proceedings with respect to the consideration 
and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with 
respect to other matters which the Constitution places 
within the jurisdiction of either House." ld., at 62'5. 
As such, the acts were protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause. 
Our cases make perfectly apparent, however, that 
everything a Member of Congress may regularly do is 
not a legislative act within the protection of the Speech 
or Debate Clause. "[T]he Clause has not been ex-
tended beyond the legislative sphere," and "[1] egislative 
acts are not all-encompassing." I d., at 624-625." Mem-
bers of Congress may frequently be in touch with and 
seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government, 
but this conduct "though generally done, is not pro-
" "Thr heart of the Claww i~ ~prrch or debate m r1thrr Hou~r 
Insofar as t hr Clau ·e i~ con~trurd to rrach other matters, they must 
be an integral part of thr drlibrrativr and commun1cat 1vr proce~~e~ 
by which Members partic1patr m comm1ttre and Housr procerdingt( 
with respect to the comnderatwn and pa~sage or rejrction of pro-
posed legislation or with respect to othPr matters wl11Ch thr Con-
~titution placr~ withm thr jurisdictiOn of r1thrr Uou~('" Gravel v, 
United 8tates. 408 () . S .. at t'i21i, 
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tected legislative activity." I d., at 625; United States v. 
Johnson, supra. Nor does the Speech or Debate Clause 
protect a private republication of documents introduced 
and made public at a committee hearing, although the 
hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative proc-
ess. Gravel v. United States. supra.'' 
"It is well known. of course'. that Members of the 
Congress engage in many activities other than the 
purely legislative activities protectf'd by the 8pecch 
or Debate Clause. These include a wide range of 
legitimate 'errands' performed for consti tupnts, the> 
making of appointments with Government agen-
cies, assistance in securing Government contracts. 
preparing so-called 'news letters · to constituents. 
news releases, and speeches deli vcred outside Con-
gress. The> range of these related activities has 
grown over the years. They arc performed in part 
because they have come to be expected by con-
stituents, and because th ey are a means of clc-
veloping continuing support for future elections. 
Although these arc entirely legitimate activities. they 
are political in nature rather than legislative . m thP 
sense that term has been usee! by the Court 111 prwr 
cases. But It has never been seriously contended 
that these political matters, however appropriate. 
have the protectwn afforded by the ~peech or De-
bate Clause." United States v. Hretuster, supra, at 
51:2 
The proper scope of our inquiry, therefore, IS whether 
the Speech or Debate Clause affords absolute 1mmumty 
from private suit to persons who , w1th authorization from 
Congress, distribute materials which allegedly mfringe 
" In Gravel we lwld thnt ·· pnvntl' publlcnt10n h~· 8<'nator (;rnvrl 
through the cooperation of Beacon Pr<·~~ wn,.; 111 no wn~· <'""<'nt tal 
to tlw dPitheratwn~ of thr 8ennt<' ... ~OS \T 8 .. :11 ti:25 
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upon the rights of individuals. The respondent insists 
that such public distributions are protected, that the 
Clause immunizes not only publication for the informa-
tion and use of Members in the performance of their 
legislative duties but also must be held to protect "pub-
lications to the public through the facilities of Con-
gress.'' Public dissemination, it is argued, will serve "the 
important legislative function of informing the public 
concerning matters pending before Congress . ' ' 
Brief for Legislative Respondents, p. 27. 
We do not doubt the importance of mforming the 
public about the business of Congress. However, the 
question remains whether the act of doing so, simply 
because authorized by Congtess, must always be con-
sidered "an integral part of the deliberative and com-
municative processes by which Members participate in 
committee and House proceer;:lings" with respect to legis~ 
lative or other matters before the House. Gravel v. 
United States, supra, at 625. "] n no case has this Court 
ever treated the Clause as protecting all conduct relatiny 
to the legislative process. ln every case thus far before 
this Court. the Speech or Debate Clause has been limited 
to an act which was clearly a part of the legislative proc-
ess-the due functiOning of the process." United States 
v. Brewster, supra, at 515- 516. A Member of Congress 
may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's 
stand in his home district. and clearly the Speech or 
Debate Clause would not protect such an act even though 
the libel was read from an official committee report."' 
The reason is that republishing a libel under such Cir-
cumstances is not an essential part of the legislative proc-
10 The repubhcatiOil of a libel, Ill cJrctun~tallCPH when• the Initwl 
publication 1s pnvilegcd, Js generally unprotected. See generally 
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 5.18 (1956); Prosser, Torts, 
766-769 (4th eeL 1971) See also Gravel v Umted States, 40 U S., 
at 622-627. 
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ess and is not part of that deliberative process "by which 
members participate in committee and House proceed-
ings." Gravel v. United States, supra, at 625. By thr 
same token, others. such as the Superintendent of Docu~ 
ments or the Public Printer or legislative personnel. who 
participate in distributiOns of actionable material beyond 
the reasonable bounds of the legislative task. rn.ioy no 
Speech or Debate ( 'laus<• mLmuntty 
Members of Congress are themselves Immune for order-
ing or voting for a publication going beyond the reason-
able requirements of the legislative function, Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, supra, but the Speech or Debate Clause 
no more insulates legislative functionaries carrying out 
such nonlegislative directives thau it protected the ser-
geant-at-arms in Kilbourn v. Thmnpson when, at the 
direction of the House, he made an arrest that the courts 
subsequently found to be ''without authority." !d., at l 
200." :::lee also Powell v . McCormack, 395 C.~., at 504 ; 
cf. Dombrowski v . Eastland, 387 F ~ . 8:2 ( 19tl7) Thr 
Clause doee not protect "cmnmal conduct threatenlllg 
the security of the persou or property of othrrs. whether 
performed at thr direction of the Senator tn prrparatw11 
for or 111 execution of a legislative act or cion<' ;vithout 
his knowledge or directiOn.' ' Gravel v. United Stales, 
supra, at 622. ~either. we tlunk . does 1t unmunizr those 
who publish and distribute oth<•rwLsP actionabl<' matenalf' 
1 ' " l11 Ktlbottl'll, thP t:3pl'Pch ur Drlmtr Clau,;r Jlrot<'CtC'd Holl>'<' 
:'vlrmber,; wbo bad adoptPd a l'('::;olut ton authonzmg Kilbourn •, 
arrp,; j ; that act wa,; clrarl~ · legil"lat tvl' 111 tHit m·<' But t h<· re:::oln -
t lOll II'H>' HUb.]rrt tO j udtCI!li l'('Vl<'ll' lll~Of <t T' H ~ It H ('Xl'('llt lOll nnping<'d 
011 n ctt1zrn '~ nght ,; a~ tt dtd thNP Thnt tlw Hou~r could wtth 
impumt~· ordrr an uncon~tituttonnl anP~t afford ed no protrction for 
tho>'<' wlto madr tlw nrrP~t " Orotwl I ' Cmterl Statr's. -+0~ !'. ~ .. 
nt I)J Jo.. , 
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beyond the reasonable requirements of thP legislative' 
function.'~ 
Thus we cannot accept the proposition that in order 
to perform its legislative function Congress not only must 
at times consider and use actionable material but also 
must be free to disseminate it to the public at large. no 
matter how injurious to private reputation that ma-
terial might be. We cannot believe that the purpose of 
the Clause-"to prevent intimidation of legislators by 
the Executive and accountability before a possibly hos-
tile judiciary." Gravel v. ('nited Slate:s, supra, at 617; l 
Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 502; United Stales v. 
Johnson, supra, at 181-will suffer in the slightest tf 
it is held that those who, at the direction of Congress 
or otherwise, distribute actionable material to the pub-
lic at large have no automatic immunity under the 
Speech or Debate Clause but must respond to private 
suits to the extent that others must respond in l}ght of 
the Constitution and applicable laws.'" To hold other-
'"Although , nH pointed out by m~ dtH~entut~ Bn•threu , tiH· aet:-:. 
of Senator Gravel wrrr not orderrd or authorizPd b.1· Congn•,;,- <H 
a C'ongn'""Ionnl commii1Pe, Gravel v G'mted State.~ . .J-0~ l ' :S. at 
025 , the fact of <·ongrP:-;sionnl authonzntton for thl' qllP>'ttonl'd HC't 
IH not HuffirtPnt to 111~ulatE' the act from .Jlldtctal "<'T'Ittiny. ln f>oll'rll 
v. !lfcConnark. :39.5 U. S. 4H() (19(i9) , for tnHtnnc<• , W<' rrvtrwl'd the 
actH of Hou"P Pmplo~'<'f'" "acttng pur,unnt to Pxprc·"~ ordPr~ of tlw 
HouHr ." !d .. at 50.J- . Wr concludc•d that "although an action 
agnm~t a Congn·H~man may l.Jp barred b~ tlw Spc•c·ch or l)pbatt · 
ClauHr, legi:;lati\'P c•mployrr" who part Icipatrd 111 tlw uncon"t It ut Ional 
activity arr rr,;pon~ibiP for thr1r act, ." fb1d . ::)pp al~o Kilbour11 v. 
Thomp8on. 10:{ U S l()k ( lHHI) : Dornh1·ou•sk1 v Ea8tland. ;~ki 
L'. S H2 (H:J(i7) . 
" ' Wr haY<' no occa~lon in this ca~l' to deridt> wlwtht•r or undPr what 
circumstances, the Speech or Debate Clause would afford immumty 
to distributors of allegedly actionable matenals from grand JUry 
questioning, criminal charges, or a suit by the executive to restrain 
distribution, where Congress has authomed the particular pubhc 
distribution. 
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wise would be to invite gratuitous injury to citizens for 
little if any public purpose. We are unwilling to sanc-
tion such a result, at least absent more substantial evi-
dence that, in order to perform its legislative function. 
Congress must not only inform the public about the 
fundamentals of its business but also must distribute 
to the public generally materials otherwise actionable 
under local law. The :-lpeech or DebatP Clause "tolerates 
and protects behavior ou the part of Members not toler-
ated and protected when done by other citizPns. but the 
shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to pn·~ 
serve the integrity of the legislative process. fT n ited 
States v. Brewster, supra, at 517. 
Contrary to the suggestion of our dissentmg Brethren. 
Wt' cannot accept the proposition that our conclusio11. 
that general, public di.::semination of materials other-
wise actionable under local law is not protected by the 
Speech or Debate Clause, will seriously undermine the 
"informing function" of Congress. To the extent that 
the Committee report is printed and mternally distributed 
to Members of Congress under the protection of the 
Speech or Debate Clause, the work of Congress 1s lll no 
way iuhibited. Moreover. the intemal distributiOn 1s 
"public'' in the sensP that materials internally circulated, 
unless sheltered by specific congressional order, arc a vail-
able for inspection by the press and by the public. We 
only deal. in the present case. with general, public dis-
tributwn beyond the halls of Con -resstand the estab-
lishments of 1ts fHnetw·ng, and beyond the apparent 
needs of the "due functioning of the llegislativel proc-
ess." United States v. Brewster, supra, at 516. 
That the Speech or Debate Clause has finite hmits is 
important for present purposes. The complaint before 
us alleges that the respondents caused the committee 
report "to be distributed to the public," that "distribu~ 
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tion of the report continues to the present," and that 
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute 
and publish" damaging information about petitioners and 
their children. It does not expressly appear from the 
complaint, nor is it contended in this Court, that either 
the Members of Congress or the Committee personnel did 
anything more than conduct the hearings, prepare the 
Report, and authorize its publication. As we have stated, 
such acts by those respondents are protected by the 
Speech or Debate Clause and may not serve as a 
predicate for a suit. The complaint was therefore 
properly dismissed as to these respondents. Other re-
spondents, however. are alleged to have carried out a 
public distribution and to be ready to continue such 
dissemination. 
In response to these latter allegations, the Court of Ap-
peals, after receiving sufficient assurances from the re-
spondents that they had no intention of seeking a repub-
lication or carrying out further distribution of the report, 
concluded that there was no basis for injunctive relief. 
But this left the question whether any part of the pre-
vious publication and public distribution by respondents 
other than the Members of Congress and Committee per-
sonnel went beyond the limits of the legislative immunity 
provided by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Com-
stitution. Until that question was resolved, the com-
plaint should not have been dismissed on threshold im-
munity grounds, unless the Court of Appeals was correct 
in ruling that the action against the other respondents 
was foreclosed by the doctrine of official immunity, a 
question to which we now turn .'' 
'' While an mquiry such a:s is mvolvcd m the pre~rnt case, bPcau:se 
it mvol ves two coordinate branches of Government , mu:st necC'ssani~ · 
ha ve ~rpnra ti on of power tm phcat ions, t he separa tion of pow(' fs do('-
t rine has not prrv10usly pr<'vcntf'd tht::; Court from rC'vtewmg t lw 
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II 
The official immunity doctrine, which "has in large 
part been of judicial making," Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 
564, 569 ( 1959), confers immunity on government offi-
cials of suitable rank for the reason that "officials of 
government should be free to exercise their duties unem-
barrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts 
done in the course of those duties-suits which would 
consume time and energies which would otherwise be 
devoted to governmental service and the threat of which 
might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effec-
tive administration of policies of government." I d., at 
571.'~ The official immunity doctrine seeks to reconcile 
two important considerations-
" [ 0] n the one hand, the protection of the individual 
citizens against pecuniary damage caused by oppres-
sive or malicious action on the part of officials of 
the Federal Government; and on the other, the pro-
tection of the public interest by shielding responsible 
governmental officers against the harassment and 
inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded dam-
age suits brought on account of action taken in the 
exercise of their official responsibilities." I d., at 565. 
In the Barr case, the Court reaffirmed existing immu-
nity law but made it clear that the immunity conferred 
might not be the same for all officials for all purposes. 
!d., at 573; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 
acts of Congrc;;;;, ser, e. g., Kilbourn v. Thomp~on, supra; Dom-
brows!c~ v. Eastland, supra, even when the Exrcnttvr Branch to; abo 
involved, see, e. g .. United States v Brewster. supra; Gravel v 
United States, supra. 
'"Both bPfore and aftpr Barr, olfictal tmmuntty ha:; lwPn hPid ap-
plicable to officials of the Legislative Branch. See Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 
(1967) . 
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378; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967). 
Judges, like executive officers with discretionary func-
tions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of 
their motive or good faith. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 
569; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967). But 
policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more 
limited privilege. I d., at 555-558. Also, the Court de-
termined in Barr that the scope of immunity from 
defamation suits should be determined by the relation 
of the publication complained of to the duties entrusted 
to the officer. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 573-574; see also 
the companion case, H award v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593, 
597-598 (1959). The scope of immunity has always 
been tied to the "scope of authority." Wheeldin v. 
Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963). In the legislative 
context, for instance, "[t]his Court has not hesitated 
to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found 
Congress was acting outside its legislative role." Ten-
ney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377. Thus, we have recog-
nized "the immunity of legislators for acts within the 
legislative role," Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554 ( 1967), 
but have carefully confined that immunity to protect 
only acts within "the sphere of legitimate legislative I 
activity." Teuney v. Brandhove, supra, at 376; cf. 
Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 486. 
Because the Court has not fashioned a fixed, invariable 
rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry 
into whether the contributions of immunity to effective 
government in particular contexts outweighs the perhaps 
recurring harm to individual citizens, there is no ready-
made answer as to whether the remaining fec!eral re-
spondents-the Public Printer and the Superintendent of 
Documents-should be accorded absolute immunity in 
this case. Of course, to the extent that they serve legis-
lative functions, the performance of which would be im-
mune conduct if done by congressmen, these officials 
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enjoy the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
Our inquiry here, however, is whether, if they participate 
in publication and distribution beyond the legislative 
sphere, and thus beyond the protection of the Speech or 
Debate Clause, they are nevertheless protected by the 
doctrine of official immunity. Our starting point is at 
least a minimum familiarity with their functions and 
duties. 
The statutes of the United States create the office of 
Public Printer to manage and supervise the Government 
Printing Office, which, with certain exceptions, is the au-
thorized printer for the various branches of the Federal 
Government. 44 U. S. C. § 301. "Printing and bind-
ing may be done at the Government Printing Office only 
when authorized by law." § 501. The Public Printer 
is authorized to do printing for Congress, §§ 701-741, 
901- 910, as well as for the Executive and Judicial 
Branches of Government, §§ 1101- 1123. The Public 
Printer is authorized to appoint the Superintendent of 
Documents with duties concerning the distribution and 
sale of documents. §~ 1701- 1722. 
Under the applicable statutes, when either House of 
Congress orders a document printed. the Printer is to 
print the "usual number" unless a greater number is 
ordered. § 701. The "usual number" is 1,682, to be 
divided between bound and unbound copies and dis-
tributed to named officers or offices of the House and 
Senate, to the Library of Congress, and to the Superin-
tendent of Documents for further distribution "to the 
State libraries and designated depositories." I bid.'" 
There are also statutory provisions for the printing of 
w For the nuthon za t1011 to ~uppl~ · ~ uJJi c ir11t eop ie:o for ~u eh distri-
bution see § 738. The Public Print er is also required to furnish the 
Department of State with 20 copies of all congre::; ·ional documents, 
and reports. 44 U S. C. § 715, 
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extra copies, § 702, bills and resolutions, § 706- 708, public 
and private laws, postal conventions, and treaties, § § 709-
712, journals, § 713, the Congressional Directory, § 721-
722, memorial addresses, § 723- 724, and the Statutes at 
Large, ~ 728- 729 . Section 733 provides that "[t]he Pub-
lic Printer on order of a Member of Congress, on prepay-
ment of costs, may reprint documents and reports of 
committees together with the evidence papers submitted. 
or any part ordered printed by the Congress." 
With respect to printing for the Executive and Judicial 
Branches, it is provided that " [a] head of an executive 
department .. . may not cause to be printed, and the 
Public Printer may not print, a document or matter 
unless it is authorized by law and necessary to the public 
business." § 1102 (a). The executive departments and 
the courts are to requisition printing by certifying that 
it is "necessary for the public service." § 1103. 
The Superintendent of Documents has charge of the 
distribution of all public documents except those printed 
for use of the executive departments, "which shall be 
delivered to the departments," and for either House of 
Congress, "which shall be delivered to the Senate Service 
Department and House of Representatives Publications 
Distribution Service." § 1702. He is thus in charge of 
the public sale and distribution of documents. The Pub-
lic Printer is instructed to "print additional copies of a 
Government publication, not confidential in character, 
required for sale to the public by the Superintendent of 
Documents," subject to regulation by the Joint Commit-
tee on Printing. § 1705. 
It is apparent that under this statutory framework, 
the printing of documents and their general distribution 
to the public would be "within the outer perimeter" of 
the statutory duties of the Public Printer and the Super-
intendent of Documents. Barr v. Mateo, supra, at 575. 
Thus, if official immunity automatically attaches to any 
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conduct expressly or impliedly authorized by law, the 
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint 
against these officials. This, however, is not the govern-
ing rule. 
The duties of the Public Printer and his appointee, the 
Superintendent of Documents, are to print, handle, dis-
tribute, and sell government documents. The Govern-
ment Printing Office acts as a service organization for 
the branches of the Government. What it prints is pro-
duced elsewhere and is printed and distributed at the 
direction of the Congress, the departments, the independ-
ent agencies and offices, or the Judicial Branch of the 
Government. The Public Printer and Superintendent 
of Documents exercise discretion only with respect to 
estimating the demand for particular documents and ad-
justing the supply accordingly. The existence of a Pub-
lic Printer makes it unnecessary for every government 
agency and office to have a printer of its own. The Print-
ing Office is independently created and manned and 
imbued with its own statutory duties ; but, we do not 
think that its independent establishment carries with it 
an independent immunity. Rather, the Printing Office 
is immune from suit when it prints for an executive de-
partment for example, only to the extent that it would 
be if it were part of the department itself or, in other 
words, to the extent that the department head himself 
would be immune if he ran his own pnnting press and 
distributed his own documents. To hold otherwise would 
mean that an executive department could acquire im-
munity for non-immune materials merely by presenting 
the proper certificate to the Public Printer, who would 
then have the duty to print the material. Under such a 
holding, the department would have a seemingly fool-
proof method for manufacturing immunity for materials 
which the court would not otherwise hold immune if not 
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sufficiently connected with the "official duties" of the 
department. H award v. Lyons, 360 U. S., at 597. 
Congress has conferred no express, statutory immunity 
on the Public Printer or the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. Congress has not provided that these officials 
should be immune for printing and distributing materials 
where those who author the materials would not be. 
We thus face no statutory or constitutional problems in 
interpreting this doctrine of "judicial making." Barr v. 
Matteo, 360 U. S., at 569. We do, however, write in the 
shadow of Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 
U. S. 564 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U. S. 433 (1971), where the Court advised caution 
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation , honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him ... . " I d., at 437. We conclude that, for 
the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of im-
munity, the Printer and the Superintendent of Docu-
ments are no more free from suit in the case before us 
than would be a legislative aide who made copies of the 
materials at issue and distributed them to the public at 
the direction of his superiors. See Dombrowski v. East-
land, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). The scope of inquiry becomes 
equivalent to the inquiry in the context of the Speech 
or Debate Clause, and the answer is the same. The 
business of Congress is to legislate ; congressmen and 
aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating. 
But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate 
legislative activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 
376, they enjoy no special immunity from local laws pro-
tecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary 
citizen. 
Because we think the Court of Appeals applied the 
immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause and of the 
doctrine of official immunity too broadly, we must reverse 
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its judgment and remand the rase for appropnate fur~ 
thcr proC'eedings. 17 \Vc• are unawan•. from this rc•c·ord. 
of the extent of the publication and distribution of the 
Report which has taken place to date. Thus \\'C have 
little basis for judging whether the legitimate legislative 
needs of Congress. and hence the limits of immunity, 
have been exceeded. These matters are for the lower 
courts in the first instance. 
Of course, like the Court of Appeals, we indicate noth~ 
ing as to whether petitioners have pleaded a. good cause 
of action or whether respondents have other defenses, 
constitutional or otherwise. We have dealt only with 
the threshold question of immuttity.1' 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in 
part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to 
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent. 
with this opinion. 
1 o ordered. 
17 With n·~p<•<·t to the I )t~tt'l<'t of ('olumhta n·~potHI<·nt". tlw Colll't 
of Appeals found that they werr actmg withu1 the "l'OJ><' of thetr 
authorit~· under applicable law and, a;; a rrsult , wen• immurw from 
suit. We do not di:4urh the judgment of the Court of Appeab Ill 
thi respect. 
18 \Y<• thu" h:tl'<' no orca~1011 to <'OII~rd<·r ,\rt. I, § 5. !'! . :;, IY!tl!'li 
requires that '· Each Housr shall krrp a Journal of rts Proceedings, 
and from time to time publish the same, excepting :;uch Part s as 
may in their .Judgment require Secrecy "; nor need we deal 
with publications of the .Judicral Branc·h and thr legal Immunities 
that may be attarhed. thereto 
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